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Abstract
Climate change induced resettlement (CCIR) is emerging as an issue that planners will need
to address. It is expected that how planners in different political and economic contexts
around the world respond will be shaped in large part by how they have traditionally
planned. If so, it is important to consider the strengths and weaknesses of these different
planning frameworks when applied to CCIR. This is a particularly important question in
this context because of the unique nature of climate change, particularly the fact that it is
typically less clear when resettlement is the right response.
This thesis examines climate change induced resettlement in two very different contexts,
which could be considered archetypes of two very different planning frameworks - the
resettlement of Tibetan nomads in Qinghai, China, and the response in the United States,
and New Orleans in particular, to Hurricane Katrina. The Chinese approach can be typified
as authoritarian in nature, favoring scientific management by a cadre of professional,
centralized planners. The American approach can be considered market-oriented and
laissez faire, minimizing government intervention.
The conclusion reached is that both planning frameworks have strengths and weakness,
and should be learned from. The Chinese approach is better able to tackle the resettlement
question proactively, using information to make decisive decisions. In contrast, uncertainty
around the impacts of climate change, the inadequate dissemination and consideration of
information, and resistance to government intervention make proactive decision making in
the American context difficult. The Chinese approach does, however, have shortcomings;
resettlement plans are largely generic and thus insensitive to individual needs and
preferences, and planners hold a great deal of power that can be used nefariously.
In terms of resettlement itself, the American approach allows for a greater diversity of
responses, better matching household preferences, as most decisions are made at the
household level. The Chinese approach is highly standardized, reflecting the centralized
and comprehensive nature of planning. The American approach does, however, arguably
fail to provide satisfactory options for the marginalized while the Chinese approach
provides the same resettlement scheme to all.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The impacts of climate change will vary from place to place and sector to sector. What is
clear is that these impacts will be significant, and we will need to adapt to them. As the City
of London's climate change adaptation strategy notes (Greater London Authority 2008: vii):
Even if all global greenhouse gas emissions could be stopped today, the immense
inertia in Earth's climate systems means that changes to our climate for the rest of
this century are unavoidable (...) International efforts to reduce global emissions are
not so far making the drastic reductions required, so we may be heading for further
and potentially more profound changes to our climate.
In fact, many argue that climate change is already being felt from New Orleans to Darfur,
and remote Alaskan fishing villages to southeastern Australia. Some changes are subtler,
including slowly rising sea levels and average temperatures. Others are more drastic,
including increases in the intensity and frequency of major storm events, and prolonged
droughts.
Regardless of the time scale within which they occur, climatic conditions will be altered
enough in some cases to destabilize the ecological and social balances that humans depend
on, either directly or in concert with other factors as a 'multiplier', forcing drastic lifestyle
changes and even migration. In fact, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has predicted that human migration could be the most significant consequence of climate
change (Brown, Oli 2008). Climate change displaced persons (CCDPs) will need
alternatives; some will migrate and join other communities, some will return to their
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original communities, at least as a short-term response and potentially at their peril, and
others will resettle in new communities.
Given that climate change may lead to a drastic increase in the volume of CCDPs, and that
climate change presents new challenges in its own right, the ways in which resettlement is
planned, implemented and supported are important to consider. The nascent literature on
climate change induced resettlement (CCIR) asserts that planning involves meeting
peoples' needs, creating viable livelihoods, and, in some cases, finding homes for newly
stateless populations, as unplanned for migration has the potential to overwhelm
infrastructure and services, lead to unsustainable and unsatisfactory livelihoods among
both CCDPs and others in the areas they migrate to, and subsequently lead to tension and
violence (See, for example, Brown, Oli 2008; Johnstone 2008). This literature, which is
largely the product of development-oriented international organizations, is unsurprisingly
normative in its prescriptions for how governments and organizations should meet the
needs of CCDPs. However, if past and present planning to address other problems is any
indication, how and the degree to which CCDPs are planned for will vary widely between
countries and cases, depending on their broader planning frameworks.' The few cases of
resettlement that have already been characterized as climate-induced would confirm that
the variation in planning responses is indeed wide here too.2
1A 'planning framework' is the broader political and economic model within which plans are developed
and implemented.
2 The limited number of cases in which climate change has been cited as a potential driver of resettlement
include the two case studies that form the core of this thesis - planning post-Hurricane Katrina in the
United States and nomadic resettlement in Qinghai, China - small Pacific islands, including the Carteret
Islands, and resettlement in Bangladesh.
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The question is: How do very different planning frameworks effect resettlement planning
in practice? What are the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to planning -
and associated economic and political systems - in terms of their ability to prepare for
CCIR, and provide the best resettlement options for those involved?
This paper focuses on two very different approaches to resettlement. The first is in Qinghai,
China, and involves the resettlement of Tibetan nomads. In terms of a broader planning
framework, the Chinese model can be characterized as authoritarian and scientific
rationalist, with an emphasis on top-down decision-making by experts. The second case I
examine is planning post-Hurricane Katrina in the United States. In the United States, the
broader planning framework can be characterized as market-oriented and laissez-faire, or
neoliberal, with a limited role for government and strong dependence on individual
freedom and market forces.
The assumption is often made that a market-oriented approach will lead to better
individual and collective outcomes. The rationale is that households have the freedom to
optimize their own outcomes by making the decisions that will benefit them to the greatest
degree, given the resources they have. This, in turn, leads to optimal outcomes in the
aggregate, as markets will provide the means for people to trade until a Pareto optimal
state is reached.3 In the sphere of governance and policy, this neoliberal approach
translates into the assertion that government should play a minimal role, largely confined
3 These assertions are rooted in the Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics, which are seen as
descendants of Adam Smith's 'invisible hand', and are implicitly and explicitly widely accepted in
economic theory (Stiglitz 1991). The first theorem states that - provided certain conditions are met -
market economies are naturally Pareto optimal, meaning that no one can become better off without
making someone else worse off (Stiglitz 1991). The second theorem states that the price system(markets) can lead to all possible Pareto efficient outcomes, so all government needs to do is facilitate
lump sum transfers to address initial equity issues (Stiglitz 1991).
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to referee or safety net of last resort in extreme cases. The assumption here too is that
households know what is best for them, and, provided that they have adequate
information, will make the right decisions for themselves, balancing the risks and rewards
of any options as they see fit. In the context of CCIR, this means that the government should
encourage a variety of private responses, leave the bulk of decision making to households,
and provide little assistance, largely disbursed in the form of cash or other transferrable
support so that recipients can use it as they wish. Planning is given a minimal role, as little
decision-making is in government hands.
There are a few weaknesses with this approach. First of all, as Stiglitz (1991) illustrates,
markets are typically incomplete (i.e. not all options are provided), most if not all players
are working with imperfect information, and there is rarely perfect competition. Secondly,
Pareto efficiency says nothing about equity and, in fact, the false dichotomy between
market efficiency and equity measures introduced with the Second Welfare Theorem
ignores the fact that governments cannot and do not engage in lump sum resource
distribution in practice (Stiglitz 1991). As a corollary, more market-oriented societies tend
to have significant disparities between rich and poor, and subsequently disparities in
access to various options in the marketplace. 4 Thirdly, imperfect information plays a
disproportionately important role in terms of planning for CCIR, as when conditions
warrant resettlement as opposed to adaptation in-place is typically unclear.
4 For example: according to the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Report
2007/2008, the United States has the highest Gini Coefficient - which is a measure of inequality of wealth
- of any developed country.
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In stark contrast, the assumption in centrally planned scientific management systems is
that government planners have access to superior information, and appropriate
methodologies for assessing and synthesizing that information, and are better equipped to
ensure that everybody's needs are met in both the short and longer terms. Economically,
markets may play a role in the distribution of goods, but under the shadow of strong state
management. In the political sphere, citizens may have some recourse, but planners make
most decisions within the framework of a strong technocratic bureaucracy. In the context
of CCIR planning, the government plays a strong role coordinating the response.
There are weaknesses with this approach too. First of all, as countless examples of
authoritarianism in practice around the world have illustrated, "All power tends to corrupt
and absolute power corrupts absolutely" (Lord Acton in Wikiquote 2009). Amundsen
(1999) empirically illustrates the inverse correlation between the strength of a country's
democracy and its level of corruption. Secondly, planners are expected to not only be
altruistic but omniscient too, holding the capacity to deduce the right response for
everyone in what are complex situations. This is unrealistic, and thus responses are often
not optimal, nor what each household would choose for itself if given agency.
Given the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches to planning, the thesis of this
paper is that both bring advantages and disadvantages to the emerging discourse on
planning for CCIR. The authoritarian Chinese model is more proactive and provides an
essentially uniform response, including to the poorest members of a given community.
Both the motivations and competencies of planners must, however, be trusted to a much
greater degree, given the power they wield. Furthermore, the standardized approach is not
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utilizing peoples' resources to attain the Pareto optimal outcome in all cases. The American
model allows for individual choice and freedom, but proactive responses are difficult to
engender and the most marginal often fall through the cracks. A suitable hybrid approach
could draw strengths from both. Households could, for example, be given agency to play a
part in the resettlement process and build their own homes within the boundaries of a
policy mandating resettlement as necessary. Recognizing the limitations of the two systems
focused on, and the unlikelihood of radical change, there are also steps each could take to
ameliorate some of their weaknesses.
Chapter 2 of this thesis will introduce resettlement as an emerging response to climate
change. Chapter 3 will further elucidate the two planning frameworks being examined,
discuss what is unique about CCIR, and introduce the two case studies. Chapters 4 and 5
are the cases themselves - Nomadic resettlement in Qinghai, China and resettlement post-
Hurricane Katrina, particularly focusing on New Orleans. These case studies are framed
with an eye towards how the broader planning frameworks these resettlements are
occurring within impact planning in practice. Finally, chapter 6 draws some general
observations and recommendations from the analysis.
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Chapter 2. Climate change and resettlement
As a starting point, it is important to consider why planning for CCDPs is an issue, and
resettlement must be acknowledged as a possible necessity. Much has been written about
climate change, so this section is brief in its general introduction, focusing more on why
resettlement deserves attention.
It is fairly safe to say that the debate around whether or not the climate is changing is over.
The Fourth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), released in 2007, states that: "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is
now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures,
widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level" (Bernstein et al.
2007: 2). The Report goes on to assert that it is very likely that the primary cause of these
changes in the climate is anthropogenic emissions (Bernstein et al. 2007). This is notable,
given that the report is the product of hundreds of scientists; is vetted by hundreds more,
including representatives of most states; and has traditionally been criticized as watered
down in light of the need to reach such broad consensus. From the popular press to the
scientific journals, the discussion is moving on to how quickly that change is happening,
what the implications are, and how we will adapt (Oreskes 2004; Lydersen 2009).
The broad implications of climate change are quite well understood. The IPCC Fourth
Assessment report observes or predicts the following trends with varying degrees of
certainty (Bernstein et al. 2007): The melting of glaciers, ice caps and the polar ice sheets;
sea level rise; decreases in snow and ice; changing precipitation patterns, with increased
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precipitation in some areas and decreased precipitation in others; less cold days and frosts,
and more heat waves; an increase in the number of intense tropical cyclones; increased
instability in mountains and other permafrost regions with ground melt; and shifts in the
ranges of flora and fauna, and in their seasonal cycles.
These trends are expected to have, or are already having, serious impacts, including:
Increased heat-related mortality; changes in infectious disease vectors; changes in the
ranges of flora and fauna, with increased rates of extinction; flooding; drought and water
scarcity; and increases in the frequency and intensity of tropical storms (Brown, Oli 2008).
Furthermore, even if we were to drastically reduce emissions today, scientists note that our
climate has a great deal of lag, meaning that we are likely to experience the changes
outlined above based on the greenhouse gasses already present in our atmosphere in
elevated concentrations (Byravan and Rajan 2006).
Adapting to the inevitable
In light of the changes to our climate already underway, governments and other
organizations are asserting that they need to plan how best to adapt. Adaptation strategies
have been, or are being, developed by governments and agencies at all scales, from the
World Health Organization to the City of Cape Town, and Finland in between (Ministry of
Agriculture and Forestry 2006; Mukheibir and Ziervogel 2006; World Health Organization
2009).
Adaptation planning is, however, nascent and thus far not nearly comprehensive enough to
adequately address concrete changes at the local level. For example, the City of London's
plan is among the most comprehensive, yet still barely skims the surface regarding how
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climate change will impact the city at the level of individual facilities, streets and so on, let
alone what technical adaptation measures will be required. For example, it quantifies what
proportion of various infrastructure - schools, police stations, bus depots, gypsy and
traveler sites, and so on - are in various flood zones and provides some global advice
regarding how the city could better prevent and prepare for flooding, but does not discuss
how this infrastructure will need to be reinforced, moved or prepared in light of increasing
risks of flooding (Greater London Authority 2008).
The key takeaways from the London strategy, and most like it, are not concrete adaptive
measures, but assertions that planning is necessary and recommendations regarding what
research and analysis should be conducted next to better understand and respond to this
complex and multi-dimensional issue. Planning practitioners are a long way from fully
understanding how climate change will play out on the landscape let alone what the best
adaptive responses are.
Resettlement as a response
In some cases, resettlement - which can be thought of as the most extreme adaptive
response - may be necessary when it is clear that viable livelihoods are no longer
sustainable in a given region. Researchers are only starting to investigate - and policy
makers and politicians concern themselves with - how climate change will displace
populations and what this displacement might look like (UNHCR 2008).
It is not surprising that small island states are the first to face the very real threat of climate
change associated sea level rise swallowing their lands and forcing them to migrate. Some
estimate that countries like Tuvalu, with its highest point at 4.5 meters above seal level,
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will be completely submerged under rising seas within fifty years (Conisbee and Simms
2003; Friends of the Earth Australia 2007). Recognizing this, Tuvalu's Prime Minister was
among the first world leaders to request assistance, and a destination, for his citizens
(Lopez 2007). In fact, in light of inaction and the gravity of the situation, Prime Minister
Talake went so far as to threaten legal action against the developed states responsible for
the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions (Conisbee and Simms 2003).
Resettlement, rather than rebuilding, was also recommended in particularly vulnerable
neighborhoods of New Orleans post-Katrina, but this advice has largely been ignored
(Whoriskey 2007a). Beyond a handful of extreme cases, resettlement has, however, rarely
been considered as an appropriate adaptive response thus far. As climate change
intensifies, this may change. The drivers of climate migration that small island states are
experiencing now may merely be harbingers of much wider-scale climate change the world
can expect.
There are myriad ways in which climate change is expected to induce migration, including
(Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2008; Brown, Oli 2008;
UNHCR 2008): Flooding and inundation; increases in the frequency and intensity of
tropical storms; land destabilization; reductions in fresh water availability; desertification;
salt water intrusion; extreme heat waves; shifts in the distribution of flora and fauna; and
political and social instability, often accompanied by violent conflict, that is triggered by a
diminishing resource base. Climate change will be the only driver in some cases, but will
act in concert with other forces in most.
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What is daunting are the millions, if not billions, of people exposed to climate risks that
may force them to uproot (Biermann and Boas 2008). For example, approximately half of
Bangladesh's population of over 150 million live in areas below five meters above sea level,
and sixteen of the worlds nineteen mega cities, from New York to Bombay, are in low-lying
coastal areas (Conisbee and Simms 2003; Friends of the Earth Australia 2007). Shanghai
and the surrounding Province, China's economic heart, face the very real risk of complete
inundation in the coming decades due to sea level rise and subsidence (Myers 1993).
According to the UNFCCC (2007), millions of people in the catchment areas of the
Himalayas and Andes face the perverse risks of too much water causing flooding, as glacial
melt is accelerated, then drought and water scarcity once the glaciers are gone.
Estimates of how many people will be displaced vary widely - from 25 million to a billion
by 2050 (Myers 1993; Brown, Oli 2008; Friedman 2009b; Hodgkinson et al. 2009). Some
predict that climate change will induce the largest migration in human history, and that
many of those displaced will be among the world's poorest, with few options and little
preparation for finding new homes elsewhere (Friedman 2009a). Others caution that
poorly-devised and overblown statistics are being used to culture fear and that the number
that actually can migrate will be much lower, as would-be migrants need a place to go that
has the necessary socioeconomic foundations in place before they can or will move (Piguet
2008; Friedman 2009b). This is, however, no reason to be hopeful. To the contrary, it
reflects how desperate and already marginalized many of those that will feel the greatest
impacts of a changing climate are, and how few options they have.
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The scale of impending CCIR is unknown and likely impossible to accurately pinpoint. It
will, of course, depend on how much the climate changes, and on how successful other
adaptation measures are. Nonetheless, we know it is coming, we do know the general
locales in some cases, and it is beneficial to start planning now.
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Chapter 3. Planning for resettlement
General planning frameworks
Planning for CCIR is naturally nested within, and responsive to, the broader general
planning frameworks of the countries within which it is taking place. This is especially true
in terms of China and the United States, as they arguably have pronounced general
planning frameworks - that is, political and economic systems - that greatly shape how
planning occurs in practice. It is, therefore, important to assess these broad frameworks to
anticipate how CCIR planning will be conducted in practice.
Planning has a strong tradition of asserting itself to be above the political fray, and even
above values, emanating from its modern roots in scientific rationalism post-enlightenment
(Friedmann 1987; Baum 1988; Campbell and Marshall 1999). Modern planners emerged as
a technocratic management class that, in the Hamiltonian and Taylorist traditions, is
entrusted to devise the most appropriate plans and policies in any context using value-free
facts and empirical tools.
Frederick Taylor, who is widely credited as the father of modern scientific management,
argues in his Principles of Scientific Management monograph that scientific methods and
strict pre-defined standards should be followed to maximize efficiency, rather than the
traditional 'rule-of-thumb' approaches (Taylor 1911). He prepared his original monograph
for the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, and thus focused on manufacturing, but
argues that the principles are applicable to all sectors, including 'governmental
departments' (Taylor 1911). This is a recommendation that did not go unnoticed; his ideas
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went on to have a major influence in places as different as the United States, particularly
during the New Deal, and the Soviet Union (Hughes 2004).
In some ways, scientific management has waned in the Western planning tradition,
particularly in the public sector. This is in part due to the rise of relativism, which asserts
that - despite scientific rationalism's claims otherwise - values cannot be separated from
decisions and there is no single discernible 'correct' path that can be rationally revealed by
planners provided they have the necessary information and skills (Campbell and Marshall
1999). The notion that planners will always plan in the public interest rather than to
personal or entrenched interests, or that personal greed can be surmounted via stricter
rules and planning guidelines, has also been challenged.
Scientific management in public planning is, however, far from dead. Planning in
authoritarian state-socialist (i.e. 'communist') states continues as a potent permeation of
this tradition; the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is trusted to know what is best for, and
plan in the interests of, the masses (Marx 1875). Even outside state-socialist regimes,
scientific management lives on in practice; planners may be more humble and forced to
barter with other parties, but much of planning is still analyzing a situation, identifying
ideal outcomes and devising a global plan to reach them (Friedmann 1987).
Some are skeptical of the ability of planners to discern the correct, most efficient, path and
maintain the integrity to follow it in the public interest rather than deviating for personal
gain. One school that the skeptical have turned to is free-market capitalism, otherwise
known as, or analogous to, neoclassical economics or neoliberalism. This is the school of
Adam Smith, Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman (Friedmann 1987). Neoliberals
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argue that the cumulative effects of individuals following their own selfish interests will act
as an 'invisible hand', regulating the market and leading to the optimal outcomes (Stiglitz
1991). This laissez-faire approach can be thought of as an anti-planning tradition, as it
presupposes that government intervention should be as minimal as possible, lest it
interfere with the market's ability to derive the optimal outcomes. The market approach is,
therefore, not restricted to the economic sphere, but ultimately considered the best vehicle
for making decisions in general. Gary Becker, a Chicago school economist, is credited with
popularizing the idea that market-rationalism has huge implications beyond traditional
economics to areas as different as crime, education and even drug addiction (Harford
2006).
Scientific management and neoliberalism cannot be considered antithetic - both believe
that rational outcomes do exist and can be achieved, but differ in what they perceive as the
best way to reach them. In practice, most governance systems have taken elements of both
schools, trusting the market to efficiently distribute most goods and employ most labor, but
with some regulation by experts to protect social welfare, the environment and so on
(Friedmann 1987). The two schools often exist in contention, with neoliberals arguing that
the state should reduce it's role in the name of efficiency and proponents of scientific
management in the public sphere countering that the state should do more to identify and
regulate towards 'optimal' outcomes, protecting social interests and overcoming
corruptions in the market. Scientific management and market rationality also do not
represent a duality; a myriad of other philosophies of governance exist, including the
social-democratic tradition and anarchism.
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Political and economic systems in practice are subject to the context in which they are
instituted, including the contentions of the players involved and competing philosophies.
For these reasons, they can never perfectly match, or represent, a single philosophy.
Furthermore, political and economic systems change over time in response to the relative
power of different actors and internal and external events or trends that alter the
discourse. The United States is generally thought of as favoring free-market neoliberalism,
with a strong tradition of praising individual success and freedom from government
intervention. It is, however, also the nation of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal - a set of
major government initiatives managed by planners in the scientific management tradition
(Friedmann 1987). China's ascendance as a market powerhouse has received a great deal
of attention over the last two decades; nonetheless, this is within a rubric of strong state
control and planning, both in the private and commercial realms (Pei 2006).
Although both are ultimately hybrids, China and the United States represent suitable
archetypes of scientific management and neoliberalism respectively. Various aspects of
each country support this assertion. Despite market liberalization, China is still an
autocratic one-party state; as of 2003, the state still controlled over half of the fixed
industrial assets; and decision-making is largely opaque, involving a professional elite
prescribing strict rules to be followed (Pei 2006). In contrast, many services that are
considered public goods and thus are universally available in other developed countries,
notably healthcare, are private in the United States (Board on Health Care Services and
Institute of Medicine 2004). s As noted previously, the United States also has the highest
5 The United States is the only wealthy industrialized country in which healthcare insurance is not
universal (Board on Health Care Services and Institute of Medicine 2004).
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Gini coefficient - a measure of wealth inequality - of any developed country (United
Nations Development Programme 2007). Furthermore, the current global financial crisis
has been blamed at least in part on the extremely weak regulation of the financial industry
in the United States (Andrews 2008).
Figure 1 outlines the general approaches to planning we would expect to see in China and
the United States, given these broader political and economic planning frameworks. The
expectation is that planning in china is strong and authoritarian, with relatively
homogenous policies and procedures mandated by central bureaucracies. The population
is addressed in plans, but there is little opportunity for recourse should they disagree with
what is prescribed. In contrast, the expectation is that planning is relatively weak in the
United States, with planers conducting analysis, but often powerless to impose decisions
based on it. Furthermore, they have limited opportunity - or support - to address the
needs of marginalized populations.
Figure 1 - General approaches to planning expected in China and the United States
Unite Stat
Collective interests and well-being Self-sufficiency emphasized
emphasized
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The unique nature of planning for climate change-induced resettlement
Much can be learned from conventional approaches to resettlement, such as involuntary
resettlement implemented because of government takings (e.g. when new dams are
constructed, displacing populations) and long-term refugee resettlement. Some factors do,
however, make CCIR planning unique and thus the study of how planning for it may be
conducted important.
Chief among the differences is that climate change-related drivers of resettlement are often
less clear and present than the drivers in conventional cases; that is, there is typically no
specific point at which it is obvious that resettlement is the right response. Water levels
rising as a result of dam construction are a very clear indication that one must leave. The
political instability and violence that causes one to become a refugee or IDP is usually
similarly stark. Conversely, it is typically much less clear at the community level that the
climate is in fact changing and resettlement is the best option. The human affinity with
place is strong, and a classic 'frog in a pot' dilemma can emerge in which conditions are
deteriorating over time and the impacted communities are simply tolerating unnecessary
hardship rather than migrating because they grow used to it. When the impact of climate
change is a catastrophic event, it is easy to dismiss it as a one-off or extremely rare
occurrence rather than identifying patterns or seeing the event as a sign of increased risk.
This introduces a potential, but controversial, role for planners. If the government deems to
know what is best and wishes to foster resettlement proactively, existing uncertainty
arguably necessitates either coercion or strong enticement.
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The second factor that makes CCIR unique compared to takings-based involuntary
resettlement and refugee management is that standards, normative approaches to planning
and the allocation of financial responsibilities are not yet codified in international
conventions. While they do not always meet their obligations, countries are obliged to meet
established standards with both takings-based involuntary resettlement and in accepting
refugees (UNHCR 2007; World Bank 2007). In addition to standards, global mechanisms
are in place to support their efforts. Thus far, there are no similar standards or support
mechanisms in place for resettling CCDPs. Biermann and Boas (2008), Hodgkinson et al.
(2009), and others have proposed the codification of the responsibilities developed
countries have to CCDPs as the primary emitters of greenhouse gasses, but such
agreements appear far from entering force, and do not touch upon planning directly, but
rather broader funding and trans-national migration issues. This distinction is of particular
interest in the context of this thesis, as it theoretically means that a wider range of possible
approaches exists, and that CCIR is more likely to mirror the general planning frameworks
of the countries involved case-by-case.
CCIR planning in China and the United States - the case studies
As noted previously, it is typically impossible to definitively attribute any given migration
to climate change. Nonetheless, there are cases - such as those involving sea level rise - in
which there is strong reason to believe that it is a key factor. There are also cases in which
the drivers of migration are the same as those expected with climate change, such as
desertification and increased storm intensity and frequency. A goal in identifying case
studies to examine for this thesis was to find situations that meet the second criteria - a
shared driver - and potentially the first - climate change is a factor stimulating the drivers.
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Additionally, case studies were chosen in which the factors that make climate change-
induced resettlement unique introduced in the last section - particularly the lack of
certainty that resettlement is the right response - could be examined.
The cases studied also involve marginalized communities. While all communities can
expect to feel the repercussions of climate change, marginalized communities will
frequently be disproportionately impacted due to their spatial concentration in already
marginal areas, and because they often have the least resources, including political capital,
to respond (UNFCCC 2007; Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission
2008).
Out of the finite constellation of cases that meet the above criteria, two were chosen for in-
depth analysis based on the availability of information, including the ease of access to
planners involved for primary interviews. These two cases are: The resettlement of Tibetan
nomads in Qinghai Province, China, and post-Hurricane Katrina resettlement in the United
States. The methodology followed in assessing these cases is presented in Appendix 1.
It is notable that these cases are nested within broader national planning frameworks that
are archetypal of two very different approaches: One that is authoritarian and favors
scientific management, and the other that is market-oriented and gives very little power to
planners. This is very appropriate given the question this paper addresses: What are the
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to planning - and associated economic
and political systems - in terms of their ability to prepare for CCIR, and provide the best
resettlement options for those involved? While these two cases by no means represent all
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possible approaches to planning for CCIR, their positions towards the opposing ends of a
spectrum of planning intervention provide an informative contrast for comparison.
Figure 2 contrasts how we might expect these two different planning frameworks to
translate into CCIR planning. The following two chapters examine how planning has
proceeded in each case in practice.
Figure 2 - Expected differences in how China and the United States plan for CCIR
F United tat*es
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Chapter 4. Case study: Resettlement planning in Qinghai, China
Background
Citing desertification (exacerbated by overgrazing) and chronic poverty, the Chinese
government has been actively resettling traditionally nomadic Tibetan communities,
sometimes referring to them as 'ecological migrants' (Human Rights Watch 2007; Namgyal
2007). The government's ambitious goal is to resettle all farmers and herders in the Tibet
Autonomous Region into "safe and affordable houses" by 2011 (Xinhua 2009). Other
neighboring Provinces with large Tibetan populations, such as Sichuan and Qinghai, are
following similar trajectories (Human Rights Watch 2007; People's Daily 2008).
As is expected under a strong scientific management approach to planning, a centrally
created and orchestrated plan - called the Development-oriented Poverty Reduction
Program for Rural China - guides resettlement (China Tibet Information Center 2001). The
program's white paper contains a section titled 'Aiding the Poor by Encouraging Migration'
that mandates that the state support migration from areas with difficult living conditions
and deteriorating natural environments via subsidies and the establishment of 'migrant
settlements' that are to meet their needs without damaging the surrounding environment
further (China Tibet Information Center 2001). These dedicated settlements are typically
on the edges of larger towns or cities.
The Chinese government claims that its resettlement programs are state-of-the-art,
providing improved livelihoods and more opportunities for those involved than they had
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previously (China Tibet Information Center 2001). The government-produced China Tibet
Magazine paints the following picture (Penkyi 2007):
Over 300 Tibetan-style two-storey houses are scattered at random, and cement-
paved roads lead directly to their entrances. The village square for multiple
activities is big enough for three basketball courts. Every household can gain access
to phone, radio, television, a healthy and comfortable environment and solar energy.
Many villagers have TV sets with big screens, audio equipment, and computers, even
cars. The village leader explained to us that the changes were brought about by the
housing project. In the past, village residences were scattered and the structure of
their houses was poorly designed. Nowadays, the old-fashioned village has gone and
a new one has emerged which is bright, comfortable and modern.
Positive or negative, resettlement does have profound impacts on communities,
particularly when it involves significant lifestyle changes, such as a loss of ability to herd
livestock (Human Rights Watch 2007; Namgyal 2007). How peoples' needs, including food,
fuel and water, are being met must be considered. Changes in culture and social norms can
also be significant.
It is impossible to conclusively deduce whether or not the desertification the Tibetan
Plateau is currently experiencing has any relationship to climate change, and thus whether
or not these resettlement programs are in fact climate-related. Projections do suggest,
however, that climate change will exacerbate desertification in the region, leading to a
greater need for resettlement programs for Tibetan nomads (Ni 2000).
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Overarching planning framework
The overarching planning framework guiding planning for Nomadic resettlement can be
characterized as authoritarian, following the principles of scientific management. The
government is the dominant player in planning and service provision; in fact, it is the only
player in most cases. Within the bureaucracy, planning is very top-down, with most
decisions made at the national or provincial level and simply implemented at the local
level. In the scientific management tradition, the assumption appears to be that decisions
are best left to the most skilled planners (i.e. those that have made it to the top echelons of
their respective departments), which draft detailed plans of action lower-level
functionaries are simply to follow.
The strength of this approach is that the best minds are devoted to devising the strongest
plans. A weakness is that it makes alterations in light of contextual differences or temporal
changes difficult; lower-level planners have little leeway to learn from what they
experience on the ground and adapt plans accordingly.
Most of the government's resettlement plans and guidelines are also confidential. A
weakness here is that this limits the ability of those outside the bureaucracy, including the
residents themselves, to respond to them. It may also limit cross-departmental information
sharing, if information is restricted even within the bureaucracy. The government also
seems reticent to admit any shortcomings, making the assertion that the plans devised are
optimal and should not be questioned.
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The resettlement decision and relocation process
As noted previously, the Chinese government cites environmental concerns, particularly
desertification, and a desire to support the development of an impoverished minority
suffering because of environmental change as the reasons for proactive resettlement. Some
fear that the real reasons are more nefarious, including removing possible opposition to
resource extraction and urban development; the desire to weaken Tibetan culture, slowly
absorbing them in to mainstream Chinese society; and the desire to urbanize the
population to make it easier to monitor and control (Human Rights Watch 2007).
The processes and procedures for assessing the viability of resettling versus keeping
Tibetan nomads on their traditional lands are opaque. Government planners proactively
make the decisions; communities are informed whether or not they are part of a
resettlement scheme with little choice, nor opportunity to assess the pluses and minuses of
participating first. Nor are they given sufficient information to assess the veracity of claims
that resettlement is superior to staying and adapting. A weakness of this approach is that
those involved are naturally more skeptical of the motives of planners, and subsequently
may attempt to subvert plans to the degree possible rather than commit to them.
Furthermore, planners are given a great deal of capacity to plan to their own interests
rather than those of the communities involved. The strength of this approach is that
planners can be proactive, making decisions based on what may be superior information.
Even after a community is selected for resettlement, it is a somewhat gradual process, with
a few families selected via random draw each year. The random draw approach is logical
within a scientific management framework, as it allows for a formula to be developed at the
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top and simply implemented with little or no leeway at the local level. It does, however,
disregard the subtleties of how relatively prepared and suitable different families are for
resettlement.
Once a family is chosen, they are informed of the parameters of their resettlement package.
In the case of the Tseden family, the government has promised them 8,000 RMB
(approximately 1,200 USD) per year for 10 years, but charged 6,000 RMB for the home
itself. 8,000 RMB/year sounds like a large sum to villagers that previously had little need
for cash, but this goes quickly in their new cash-based environment. Interviewees also
noted that the money seems to be slow to come in some cases.
The government claims that, at the household level, resettlement is strictly voluntary; that
every effort is made to resettle families close to relatives, friends and their traditional
lands; and that families can keep their old homes until they have properly settled into their
new ones (China Tibet Information Center 2001). Human Rights Watch conducted an
extensive investigation, culminating in a report titled No One Has the Liberty to Refuse. As
the name suggests, they found that resettlement is, in practice, not voluntary (Human
Rights Watch 2007). The experiences of the families interviewed would suggest that the
coercion is subtle, but present. One family was informed that they had to pay for the home
either way; would not receive government payments unless they moved; may be forced to
give up their traditional home, land and livestock in the future anyways; and that their
resettlement home could be in danger of vandalism, which they would have to pay to
repair, if they did not occupy it.
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Because the planning documents are not public, it is impossible to deduce whether or not
any coercion tactics are officially sanctioned. What might be happening, given China's top-
down planning structure, is that local technocrats are expected to ensure that plans are
implemented smoothly and centrally established program goals met, and thus do what is
necessary to get the requisite levels of participation. Either way, a significant weakness of
this approach is the loss of personal autonomy and free will.
Families are given time to transition from their old to their new communities and lifestyles.
Rather than giving up all of their livestock immediately, some members of the Tseden
family resettled while leaving others in their traditional lands. The Mkhargyal family is in a
similar situation, maintaining some livestock in their traditional summer pasture. A
strength of this strategy of gradual resettlement is that it allows resettled members of the
family to maintain access to essential resources, such as dung for fuel and yak milk for
sustenance, while establishing the family's urban household and adjusting to the associated
new life. In practice, it is often the oldest and the youngest generations that move first, as
their labor is most expendable on the grasslands. A resulting weakness is that the most
productive members are not in the resettlement looking for work and contributing to
community development.
It is not clear whether or not this degree of flexibility in the transition process is officially
sanctioned. It is too soon to see how long the government will allow families to live dual
lives before they force them to sell their remaining livestock and give up their traditional
lands. It is possible that the current arrangement - which deviates from the otherwise
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strict planning process to some degree - is an aberration allowed because planners realize
that they cannot meet their objectives of providing fuel and food otherwise.
Information and consultation
According to interviewees, officials do not take settlers opinions into account. Very few
visit resettlements, and when they do residents are unable or unwilling to talk about their
problems due to lack of education and fear of retribution, according to one interviewee. An
interviewee also complained that information disseminated regarding resettlement
programs is published in Chinese, a language that many residents cannot read. Village
leaders are expected to inform their citizens, but are often given incomplete information
themselves.
Again, this can be considered typical of an authoritarian scientific management approach to
planning; planners are thought to have the correct information and subsequently optimal
plans, based on their superior analytical and decision-making skills, making consultation
unnecessary. Information is guarded on a need-to-know basis in order to avoid what are
perceived as counterproductive responses from untrained communities that do not
understand what is best for them.
The weakness of this approach is that planners do not acquire valuable local knowledge
from those they are planning for. Furthermore, community members loose even more of
their ability to define their own destinies.
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Housing/shelter
In a scientific management planning framework, one would expect housing to be available
for all, but highly standardized and utilitarian, meeting residents' needs while being cheap
and easy to build in large volumes. This is the case with Tibetan resettlement communities
in Qinghai; the homes are designed by the Provincial Resettlement Bureau and thus are
nearly identical across this massive Province, despite significant variations in climate and
the availability of various materials, and the varying needs of different households.
Government planners have made some attempts to adopt the Tibetan vernacular into the
architecture of resettlement homes, but this is largely cosmetic.
The strength of this approach is that housing is provided for all. One weakness is that the
homes families receive are not necessarily optimal for their specific needs and wishes.
Furthermore, the construction quality of housing is not particularly good. Gaps under
doors, for example, mean that energy is wasted heating homes. Contractors take little
interest in building quality, as they are awarded construction contracts based on their
ability to meet the specific volume and design specifications stipulated by the Resettlement
Bureau, regardless of where they are in Qinghai. An associated weakness is that individual
families have no opportunity to seek recourse for poor quality. Nor do builders have to
compete for their business, as housing is standardized and those being resettled have little
opportunity to seek alternatives.
Employment and self-sufficiency
Employment opportunities are limited in the towns nomads are being resettled to. This is
due to: Generally high unemployment; the lack of relevant skills, including Chinese
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language skills, and education among those being resettled; cultural differences between
predominantly Han Chinese employers and managers and would-be Tibetan workers; and
the associated Chinese tradition of hiring and building business relationships through
personal connections (guanxi), which typically excludes Tibetans.
In a heavily state-controlled context like China, one would expect government planners to
play a significant role in orchestrating the labor market, and that the state would be a
major employer. As noted previously, the state does play a major part in the economy,
despite the high-profile market liberalization of the last two decades (Pei 2006). However,
planning for employment - addressing what is an unemployment problem - is
conspicuously absent in the resettlement process. Programs to overcome the
aforementioned barriers, such as skills training, are lacking. The countervailing assertion
that the government will take care of resettled communities anyways, so unemployment is
not a crisis, appears stronger. In other words, self-sufficiency does not appear to be a
priority for planners. The good news is that the government subsequently sets the
ambitious goal of meeting people's needs. The weakness is that it is not always able to do
so. Furthermore, complete dependency may weaken the social structure of the community
and demoralize individuals.
Service and resource provision
Self-sufficiency is not a priority because the assumption is that planners can ultimately
orchestrate the necessary provision of goods and services for everyone. The government is,
for example, promising assistance with fuel for heating and cooking as part of the
resettlement process. The problem is that, in practice, it is not meeting all the needs of the
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families interviewed so far. Coal is, for example, not being provided and is expensive for
families, so they are still using yak dung provided by their relatives that remain on their
traditional lands with livestock. This solution works for now, but it is unclear what will
happen if/when these relatives give up this livestock and resettle too.
Furthermore, coal, the predominant fuel in China, has other problems, particularly in terms
of green house gas emissions and air pollution. It is ironic and problematic if changes being
instituted because of climate change-induced resettlement are further accelerating climate
change itself. Alternatives like biogas and solar cookers, which are both cleaner and
cheaper, are widespread in rural western china and could be more broadly introduced in to
resettlements. These technologies do not, however, fit well within a centrally planned
scientific management framework because they involve autonomous fuel collection as
opposed to centrally planned and implemented fuel procurement and distribution. This
inflexibility and unyielding preclusion towards centralized systems is a potential weakness
of the scientific management approach.
Nomadic families are traditionally almost entirely self-sufficient food-wise. This changes
radically when they resettle; suddenly they are forced to purchase their food. In their
traditional villages, the amount of food a family yields, and can exchange for, varies yearly
and seasonally, but if a family is short there is always a neighbor that can share some.
According to the interviewees, this does not happen in the resettlement communities, as
traditional village networks are broken and they become part of the formal food system.
This is consistent with the scientific management approach to planning, which defines food
security in terms of stability, with constant volumes fed through formalized supply chains.
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It sees the traditional, informal and highly variant, models of distribution as risky and thus
aims to supplant them with formal food systems. Again, the strength is that the government
is planning for greater food security; the weakness is that less standardized, but
traditionally sufficient, informal food systems are destroyed. This is problematic when
centralized government systems are not fulfilling their commitments and the traditional
production and exchange mechanisms are no longer present to provide a backup.
Decent water and sanitation infrastructure is essential to the viability of new settlements. It
lowers the probability of diseases and improves the quality of life by lowering the amount
of time women need to spend collecting water and providing a cleaner, more pleasant,
environment. Within a scientific management framework, one would expect centrally
engineered and fully reticulated water and sanitation systems.
Water service is excellent in the resettlements visited, with standpipes outside of each
home. That being said, the region is already facing severe water scarcity and further
desertification is projected. Planning efforts appear to take for granted that enough water
will remain available for all in growing urban areas; should this change, it is probable that
these resettlements on the edges of larger communities, both physically and politically, will
be the first cut off. A strength of the scientific management approach is that basic needs like
water are identified and their provision planned for. A weakness is that fully reticulated
systems may not be the most resilient in the face of climate change.
In contrast, sanitation service is very poor, with a complete dearth of planning for it. In the
case of Dobdain, toilet buildings were constructed, but are locked for the exclusive use of
government officials. Garbage is also unmanaged, with no designated collection areas
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leading to trash strewn about. A lack of sanitation and waste management facilities is
usually not a problem in lower-density traditional villages and nomadic camps, but
facilitates the spread of diseases and other problems in the denser urban areas
communities are resettled to. Poor sanitation could further exacerbate the spread of
diseases already anticipated with global warming, which is expected to change the ranges
of various disease vectors, like mosquitoes. A related weakness of China's authoritarian
approach is that individual initiative is not permitted or encouraged; when a problem is not
addressed - as is the case with sanitation services in the resettlements visited - it is left as
such, potentially to the detriment of a community that could potentially do something
about it if permitted.
In theory, residents have improved access to health services when resettled, as they are
closer to better clinics and hospitals. This is one of the arguments the government makes
when promoting resettlement (Human Rights Watch 2007). However, some new health
problems - including substance abuse and diseases associated with higher population
densities - may emerge. Again, the strength of the Chinese approach is that a
comprehensive set of services, including heath care and education, are prescribed. A
weakness is that they are not always responsive to changing local needs.
Education becomes all the more important when former nomads are integrated into urban
society. Children that stay in school learn Chinese and are fluent in the cash-based
economy, giving them more employment opportunities. Unsurprisingly, given the scientific
management framework, education is highly centralized across China. Local children
receive some instruction in Tibetan, but the curriculum is largely the same as that used
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elsewhere in the country. A weakness associated with this standardization is that, as
interviewees complained, students and their families cannot relate to the curriculum and
fear that school is simply a propaganda tool to indoctrinate their children into mainstream
Chinese society. Because of the lack of employment opportunities, they also fail to see how
school will improve their future.
The Mkhargyal family also noted that, ironically, educational opportunities have declined
for some children. In their case, they have a middle school back in their village, but the one
in Goma has limited enrolment and children from the main community (i.e. not the
resettlements) get priority. Again, this illustrates how an inflexible planning system can
lead to unintended consequences.
Cultural preservation and change
China's centralized planning system appears to be promoting the spread of a single unified
cultural identity and the commensurate weakening of minority cultures over time (Human
Rights Watch 2007). Traditional cultures are seen as 'backwards', as they do not value
scientific rationalism and efficiency. To those that seek to protect traditional cultures,
homogenization is a weakness of authoritarian scientific management; everyone is
expected to conform to the standardized model of resettlement and development.
Interviewees complained that their traditional culture is indeed dying out with
resettlement. There is no reason to sing the traditional songs associated with certain tasks
they performed as nomads any longer, for example. Furthermore, youth take little interest
in their traditional culture, as they are exposed and drawn to more urban Chinese or
international culture.
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Conclusion
It is not within the realm of this thesis to assess the absolute success or failure of this
resettlement program. The fact that potential participants are using the few opportunities
they have to avoid resettlement - just moving the oldest and youngest generations while
keeping the productive adults on the land, for example - would indicate, however, that the
program is unsatisfactory to some participants. For better or worse, this may change
should climate change, or other factors, make their traditional nomadic lifestyles less
viable, or the government enacts changes to make resettlement more enticing, such as
programs to increase employment prospects.
The fact that the government is resettling Tibetan nomads proactively may be helping them
avoid hardship later, as desertification intensifies. As discussed previously, a unique
problem within the context of CCIR is that there is often no specific point at which it is clear
that resettlement is the best option. If China's centralized planners do know what is best in
light of the changes they identify via empirical analysis, it is conceivable that they are
indeed planning in the long-term interests of those they are resettling.
Problems emerge because the resettled are not given access to the planning process,
including to information justifying their resettlement, and thus may be resisting rather
than working within the confines of resettlement as a foregone conclusion. This is also
problematic because it leaves a great deal of opportunity for planers to plan against the
public interest. Working with communities to understand why and how they are being
resettled may make the process smoother by engendering acceptance; make it better by
extracting feedback and ideas from those with local knowledge; and help to minimize
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corruption and nefarious decisions on the part of planners by adding an element of
monitoring.
A strength of the Chinese approach is that the planning conducted is fairly comprehensive,
addressing a wide range of needs from shelter to fuel provision. Its weakness is that it is
also very restrictive; there is little room for the resettled to improvise to overcome
shortcomings, or better meet their preferences. A positive consequence of this rigid and
comprehensive approach is that the needs of all, including the most marginalized are, at
least theoretically, addressed. On the down side, the response is not sensitive to individual
needs and wishes, with a single approach applied to everyone. Furthermore, it is not clear
that the state can satisfactorily meet everyone's needs while it is purporting that it will do
so and subsequently explicitly and implicitly weakening self-sufficiency.
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Chapter 5. Case study: Resettlement planning in
post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans
Background
Hurricane Katrina came ashore from the Gulf of Mexico on August 28th, 2005, taking over
1,800 lives and causing more than 81 billion USD in damage (U.S. Department of Health &
Human Services 2009). The City of New Orleans was hit particularly hard, with levy
breeches allowing water to flood large swaths of the city, including may of the poorest
neighborhoods. Slow and inadequate government preparations and response made
matters much worse (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006).
While the stranding of residents received more media attention - perhaps deservedly so,
given the trauma they endured - the mass migration of evacuees during and post-storm
was no less shocking and unwieldy. Over one million people were displaced, approximately
400,000 from New Orleans alone, in what was the largest mass migration in the United
States since the Dust Bowl (Appleseed 2006). Most found themselves in nearby cities, with
destinations decided based on a variety of factors, from relatives with a free couch to
where the bus they got on happened to stop. Many were not able to return home quickly;
only one quarter of residents from flooded areas of New Orleans had returned a year after
the storm (Appleseed 2006).
Ascribing blame for the damage that Hurricane Katrina caused is virtually impossible. In
fact, policy failures, engineering failures, anthropogenic environmental change and Mother
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Nature likely share the blame (Brown, Oli 2008). Credible voices have, however, noted that
climate change quite possibly played a role and could make events like this all the more
common (Burkett, Zilkoski and Hart 2003; Henderson 2005).
Overarching planning framework
There were a variety of responses to Hurricane Katrina, most chosen at the household
level. This is not surprising, given the neoliberal framework within which they occurred. As
elucidated in the Qinghai study, an authoritarian scientific management approach to
planning is likely to create a limited set of responses, developed by central planners. In
contrast, a market-oriented approach leaves the crafting of responses to competing players
- whether commercial interests or competing proposals from non-profit organizations - to
the degree possible. In other words, the emergence of a multiplicity of responses is a core
characteristic, and possibly a strength, of the overarching framework itself.
In the neoliberal paradigm, the expectation is that governments will have relatively few
resources to directly plan for and address problems. The philosophy is that the role of
government should be as small as possible, leaving the market to allocate resources most
effectively (Friedmann 1987). Another, related, assumption is that people will make
rational resettlement choices on their own, which ultimately aggregate to Pareto optimal
outcomes overall, so the government should not make them for them (Glaeser 2005).
The resettlement question
The causal relationship between climate change and Hurricane Katrina is tenuous at best,
and virtually impossible to confirm or deny. A paper published by the U.S. Geological
Survey in 2003 did, however, ominously warn that climate change-related sea level rise
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and subsidence could pose a serious risk to life and property in the New Orleans area
unless infrastructure was updated and natural systems restored (Burkett, Zilkoski and Hart
2003). An American Society of Civil Engineers group tasked with investigating the failure of
New Orleans' levees during Katrina similarly found that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
did not have adequate safety measures in place, and should have foreseen and addressed
the risks (Warrick and Whoriskey 2006). Ultimately, half of the city is below sea level and
thus the risks, even pre-Katrina, were arguably obvious. These warnings were, however,
largely ignored. This inability to use credible projections to proactively respond to threats
is a weakness of the neoliberal approach.6
Given its geography and the risks posed by a changing climate - which is projected to
include sea level rise and increases in storm severity - some have suggested that rebuilding
New Orleans to its pre-storm dimensions is not appropriate (Henderson 2005; Reardon
2006). This is not, however, always a popular or universally shared opinion, and the
market-oriented neoliberal approach leaves decision-making largely in the hands of
individuals. In the marketplace of ideas, the case for resettlement is a hard one to make.
People have extremely strong emotional, cultural and social connections to place, and need
very attractive alternatives to entice them before they will consider moving.
Post-Katrina, political leaders and planners did question whether or not they should allow
people to rebuild in certain areas of New Orleans. The first major planning effort was an
assessment by a blue ribbon panel of 40 experts from across the country, organized by the
6 Markets, at least in this case, seem to be reactive. This is perhaps because of imperfect information; the
risks were known, but most market actors did not have that data. The markets are also likely incomplete;
residents cannot access the same mix of employment, housing, community identity and so on outside of
their neighborhoods.
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Urban Land Institute (ULI) at the request of Mayor Ray Nagin. The most controversial
recommendation the panel made was that the city follow a 'selective rebuilding plan',
concentrating redevelopment in areas damaged least, and least at risk moving forward, and
turning the most damaged areas into restored wetlands and parks (Henderson 2005). This
recommendation received a very cold reception, political leaders, including Nagin,
distanced themselves from it, and subsequent efforts, like the Unified New Orleans Plan
(UNOP) process, have largely avoided the issue in favor of leaving the choice to individuals
(New Orleans Community Support Foundation 2007). Again, the market-oriented approach
was weak in its ability to use credible data to make proactive planning decisions.
The market rationalist argument is that, if resettlement elsewhere is ultimately the most
rational response, markets will signal this via increasingly expensive insurance rates and
other market mechanisms. Lester Brown (2007) of the Earth Policy Institute echoes this,
noting that danger and financial risks, compounded by the unwillingness of the insurance
industry to provide coverage, are de facto driving many people and businesses to resettle
elsewhere. This process of market signaling is, however, evidently corrupted by
government incentives and investments supporting rebuilding; government-backed
insurance schemes; and cultural, emotional and political pressures.
The government-induced corruptions are ironic given the neoliberal approach's penchant
for minimal state intervention, but a reality in practice. The National Flood Insurance
Program is one example; this government-operated program does include some caveats to
avoid profligate coastal development, but is ultimately designed to provide coverage for
property in higher-risk areas that commercial insurance companies will not cover at
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affordable rates (FEMA 2007). Various levels of government are also playing significant
roles rebuilding the levees and other infrastructure that make returning to New Orleans an
option (Henderson 2005).
The cultural, emotional and political forces are also significant, and the relatively slow pace
at which New Orleans has been rebuilt is a serious and ongoing matter of contention (Rose,
Clark and Duval-Diop 2008). Organizations like Brad Pitt's Make It Right, which is focused
on the Lower Ninth Ward, are working to fill the perceived void of government assistance
in returning the poorest to the city (Make It Right 2009).
A weakness of the neoliberal approach - which emphasizes small and relatively
disempowered government - is that it leaves government planners weak in terms of their
ability to address perceived risks proactively. In this case, they did not have the adequate
resources, or political authority, to address climate risks proactively via resettlement, levee
reconstruction, or any other approach.
Post-Katrina, a weakness of the market-oriented approach taken is that it may not be
leading to the optimal outcomes for a couple of reasons: First of all, emotional and political
forces are championing resettlement in areas that may not be suitable for resettlement,
particularly given projected climate change. These decisions are not being made based on
objective analysis, but on the assertion that everyone should have the right to rebuild their
home in the same location as before the storm (Henderson 2005; Shafer 2005). 7 Secondly,
allowing rebuilding anywhere is not efficient, as it requires that the city reconstruct its
7 A significant problem is that it is difficult to disaggregate legitimate calls to selectively rebuild from
nefarious attempts to gentrify the city. The city's largely poor and marginalized black population in
particular has good reason to be skeptical, given the long history of systemic racism.
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entire infrastructure to pre-storm dimensions rather than focusing on re-populating areas
identified as more appropriate first.
Resettlement options and selection process
The expectation in a neoliberal planning framework is that private solutions are best suited
to addressing people's needs, so government should play a minimal role. Variations in
response are therefore expected due to the variety of personal choices possible. The
relative wealth of individuals also impacts the choices they can and do make around
resettlement. In the short term, those with more resources can opt-in to more robust
choices - like leaving the city in their private automobiles and staying in a hotel when a
Hurricane is approaching - than those with fewer resources. In the longer term, some also
have the resources to choose certain resettlement (or rebuilding) options, that are not
open to others (Cutter et al. 2006).
Choice is a central tenet of a market-oriented framework. The assumption is that each
individual will make the most rational choice in light of their preferences and resources,
leading to the best possible outcomes for all (Glaeser 2005). It is not, however, clear that
satisfactory choices are always available to the displaced, especially those with the least
resources. Post-Katrina, the government has attempted to ameliorate this while still
leveraging market forces by channeling a significant proportion of its assistance as direct
cash payments to the displaced for them to use as they see fit - renting or buying
elsewhere, or rebuilding in New Orleans (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006; The Road Home Program 2007).
A weakness with this solution is that it has done little to address preexisting poverty over
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the long term, as the vulnerable have the least access to these programs, and the rental
market is typically the slowest to adequately recover (Cutter et al. 2006).
Post-Katrina, the most obvious resettlement option is, of course, not to resettle at all, but to
return to New Orleans and rebuild. As mentioned previously, several incentives and
emotional, cultural and political forces are promoting this option. Despite these forces,
many residents, particularly the most marginalized, still face major hurdles to returning
(Cutter et al. 2006).This option requires resources that many do not have. Two years after
the storm, Jervis (2007) commented that " the rebuilding of New Orleans, and much of the
Gulf Coast, has largely taken two paths: Communities that have rebuilt themselves using
private funds, insurance money and sheer will - and publicly funded efforts that have
moved much more slowly". At that point, 80% of the wealthy neighborhood of Lakewood,
which did experience extensive damage, had been rebuilt, while poorer neighborhoods like
the Lower Ninth Ward remained in ruins (Jervis 2007). The poor do not have the same
private capital, and government programs have been inadequate, mired in red tape, and
ignorant of the needs of the most marginalized, including renters. Some have gone to
extremes, like collecting cans to sell the aluminum, in order to finance reconstruction (See
Dewan 2009).
Resettlement into existing cities is a logical alternative for many of the displaced.
Significant proportions - both rich and poor - have indefinitely resettled in Atlanta,
Houston and other cities across the country; an estimated 150,000 remained in Houston
alone a year after the storm (Appleseed 2006). For some, this represents a fresh start - a
chance to get away from a city that did, after all, have among the nations highest crime and
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poverty rates, and 'academically unacceptable' schools (Shafer 2005). It is not clear,
however, that this is a viable solution for all, or even most, displaced populations.
Many of the displaced that found themselves in other cities were left in unsatisfactory
conditions. Some have found adequate housing via friends and family, their ability to get
into the public housing systems in their new locales, or using their own resources. Others
face real difficulties, with a dearth of suitable and affordable housing options (Appleseed
2006). Employment has also been a persistent problem for many, with their ability to find
jobs hindered by hurdles ranging from no childcare to unaddressed mental health issues
(Appleseed 2006).
Meeting both the shorter and longer-term needs of the influx of evacuees has proven
challenging for the cities they fled to. Migrants pose a major strain on the limited resources
these cities have, especially as many evacuees already had health and other problems and
are now in need of comprehensive care. The limited funding and other support
mechanisms that are present tend to focus on short-term emergency response and policing
to protect private property, giving little attention to the resettlement and assimilation
process, including mental health treatment, employment training and long-term housing
(Appleseed 2006). When poor and from marginalized communities, these migrants
frequently become second-class citizens in their de facto adoptive homes.8
8 Appleseed's A Continuing Storm: Struggles of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees (2006) provides
comprehensive analysis and useful recommendations regarding how destination cities could have better
managed the evacuees they received, both in the shorter and longer-terms. It is not clear, however, that
the political will exists to devote the necessary resources.
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Another resettlement option - which is typically an option of last resort for the
marginalized, and renters in particular - is the infamous Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) trailers. Trailers were broadly made available post-Katrina, and many
middle class homeowners used them on their properties as temporary shelter while they
rebuilt. For the poor, the trailers, often clustered in parks, became a housing option
indefinitely, though they were originally expected to be out within 18 months after the
storm (Adams 2006).
Crime became an all too common feature in some parks; parks were often poorly managed,
with inadequate infrastructure; the surrounding communities were often highly suspicious
and opposed to parks; and residents were often anxious to leave, but had few options
(Adams 2006; Whoriskey 2007b). Though FEMA does not plan to throw them out, the final
deadline for leaving the trailers was supposed to be May 1st of this year; at that point, about
6,000 of the most marginalized families still lived in them, many in difficult situations with
no other obvious options due to extremely weak resource bases and/or personal capacity
(Lohr 2009).
The strength of the market-oriented approach followed post-Katrina is that it allows those
impacted to rebuild or resettle as they see fit, given the resources they have. This emphasis
on individual choice theoretically means that people have the opportunity to craft the
response that is optimal to them. An associated strength is that self-sufficiency is
emphasized, potentially fostering greater resiliency and less dependence on the
government. A significant weakness is that the poor and marginalized have inadequate
resources to access a satisfactory response. While the well-endowed have resources and
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the freedom to use them as they wish, the neoliberal approach leaves the poor
marginalized and with little opportunity to succeed.
Magnaville: A non-profit resettlement response
In the neoliberal planning framework, an assumption often made is that non-profit
organizations will fill the gaps, meeting the otherwise unmet needs of the poor. An
associated belief is that the non-profit sector is a more appropriate vehicle for
implementing support and redevelopment projects than the public sector. Non-profits like
Habitat for Humanity and Brad Pitt's Make It Right Foundation are indeed playing an
important part in providing marginalized populations with other housing options. The
planned resettlement community of Magnaville is another non-profit response. While an
outlier in some ways, given that it involves planned resettlement to a purpose-built
community, Magnaville is instructive.
Magnaville was born when businessman and philanthropist Frank Stronach was so
incensed watching the events unfold in New Orleans in the immediate aftermath of Katrina
that he decided that something must be done and picked up approximately 300 people,
largely residents of the Ninth Ward, from a staging area in Alabama and took them to a
horse track he owns in Florida for temporary shelter (Carmichael 2009). Recognizing that
people were not going to be able to return home any time soon, and that this was an
opportunity to help people make a fresh start, Stronach and his team decided to construct a
new 'model community' for victims of the hurricane. 1,000 acres were acquired in the town
of Simmesport, Louisiana, and construction started in short order, with major assistance
from a variety of companies and organizations, but notably no government support and
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little government involvement (Carmichael 2009). By mid-December - less than four
months after the hurricane - residents were already moving in.
One interesting element of the Magnaville project is its pervasive social change agenda. The
belief that the project should help residents disassociate from their troubled pasts and start
fresh within an agrarian idyll, complete with an on-site organic farm, is signaled both
explicitly and implicitly (Maggi 2007; Carmichael 2009). Residents are required to live by a
set of rules - ranging from a requirement that any vehicles on their property be insured to a
prohibition on lending money to each other - that are designed to foster this social change.
One reason for choosing a rural setting for Magnaville was to provide a more relaxed pace
of life away from the vices of the city.
It is notable that the intention was not necessarily to permanently resettle project
participants, but rather to offer them 'a hand up' to get them back on their feet and into a
new life; Magna - Stronach's company, after whom the village is officially named - made an
initial commitment to fund the project for five years (Carmichael 2009). With those five
years drawing to a close in 2010, Stronach, Magna and the project team are currently
weighing their options, which include selling the property, giving residents plots of land
and allowing them to stay, or extending the project as-is.
Non-profits play an important role in fostering the self-sufficiency encouraged and
required under a market-oriented planning framework. An associated weakness is the
assumption that most can attain a high level of self-sufficiency and those that do not
deserve to suffer for it, because it is largely a personal choice.
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In terms of planning, Shane Carmichael, the Magnaville project manager, lauds the fact that
the project went from conception to occupancy in just over three months, and credits this
to the astute management abilities of the high-profile project proponents. Their business
style approach, tackling issues head-on, quickly addressing them, then rapidly moving to
the next was key. It is notable that this kind of dynamic and quick decision making is
generally impossible in government-run projects. A strength of non-profits is their ability
to respond quickly and flexibly, as they are typically not limited by the same degree of
bureaucracy as government programs are.
Within the broader market-oriented neoliberal framework, the acquisition of land on
which to build a resettlement community is also expected to follow market mechanisms.
One element of the real estate market when sensitive sitings are involved is the 'not in my
backyard' (NIMBY) syndrome; that is, significant resistance to certain land uses from
neighbors afraid it will negatively impact their property values and crime rates. As with the
FEMA trailer parks, this was the case in the siting of Magnaville. The project team was not
able to build on the first site they identified due to community opposition. They also faced
significant resistance in Simmesport; they were only able to gain tepid approval after
making concessions, including a new community center and support for additional policing,
and Carmichael adds that ongoing problems somewhat stymied their ability to focus on the
project itself.
A corollary to the free-choice nature of the neoliberal approach is that those providing
resettlement options also have a market of applicants that they may discriminate between.
In the case of Magnaville, the initial selection process was not particularly discriminating,
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but the transition to Simmesport did involve a screening process. Background checks were
conducted on applicants, and, as per an agreement reached with the Parish Magnaville is
located in, the local District Attorney reviewed any criminal records and held the right to
reject applicants.
Perhaps more importantly, in order to reside in Magnaville, program participants must sign
and conform to a 'Covenant of Responsibility'. These rules - which range from keeping your
space clean to volunteering eight hours per week in the community - encapsulate the
project vision and are designed to 'help residents avoid the problems often associated with
their old lives'. The project also reserves the right to test residents for drug use and issues
guest passes to visitors staying over night (Bohrer 2007). Tenants that do not live by the
rules are subject to eviction or, as Carmichael puts it, 'choose to not live by the rules and
thus make the choice to have to leave', and some have indeed been forced out. Carmichael
admits that his regimen can be strict, but says that this is part of helping people develop a
good work ethic and better themselves.
A weakness with this strict approach is that some people are naturally excluded.
Carmichael suggests that this is a necessary reality in making an ambitious project like this
work, and is why others like it that do not include the social change element - like the
FEMA trailer parks - have failed. In fact, one of his recommendations for future projects like
Magnaville is that they do a more thorough job of screening applicants to ensure that they
fit with the philosophy of the project. On the other hand, the least desirable also need a
place to go when they have been forced to resettle. This kind of selectivity is only possible
in a market-based system, in which the displaced have more than one resettlement option,
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and the providers of resettlement opportunities have the right to be selective, a right
typically not afforded to government agencies resettling populations.
Information and consultation
According to the neoliberal approach to planning, citizens are best 'consulted' via the
choices they make in the marketplace of options. A weakness is that this presupposes that
citizens have perfect information and complete markets exist (Stiglitz 1991). The
difficulties many of the most marginalized victims of Katrina have had accessing the right
resources and receiving support is indicative of the fact that neither perfect information
nor complete markets are present for them (Lohr 2009). Beyond the lack of options, many
among the marginalized suffer from mental illnesses, or are simply overworked as, for
example, single mothers, and thus are not able to complete paperwork and take advantage
of options that do exist.
Information is typically freely available for those than can and want to access it for their
decision-making. An example is the aforementioned USGS report forewarning of New
Orleans vulnerability, which went largely ignored (Burkett, Zilkoski and Hart 2003). The
fact that little was done to heed this warning is another matter. This is the paradox of
information in the market-oriented approach; to its credit, information is largely available,
but its weakness is that it is typically not acted upon decisively.
Housing/shelter
Within the neoliberal framework, one would expect an essentially infinite variety of
housing options, as personal preferences, coupled with resource limitations, define the
shelters households construct or attain for themselves. In practice, those with resources
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post-Katrina - namely wealthy and middle class homeowners - have largely been able to
collect on insurance policies and other government programs and rebuild as they wish,
either in New Orleans or elsewhere. A weakness is that housing options are much more
limited for the marginalized, especially those that were renters. As mentioned previously,
many have ended up in unsatisfactory FEMA trailers.
Employment and self-sufficiency
Self-sufficiency is very important under the neoliberal framework, as social safety nets are
minimal. In this context, it is not surprising that helping residents acquire gainful
employment is a central objective of most resettlement support projects. In the case of
Magnaville, all residents that are able must be gainfully employed, or actively seeking work,
under the conditions of the Covenant of Responsibility (Carmichael 2009). To facilitate
employment opportunities, training courses in agriculture, computers, construction and
other areas in which jobs are available have been provided, as has employment counseling.
While the service has been discontinued, Magnaville also provided free shuttle service to
nearby towns so that residents could access job markets. Residents are also required to
volunteer eight hours a week in the community, with the intention to instill both
community service and work ethics.
Despite these programs, un- and underemployment remain a problem in the community.
Carmichael attributes this largely to the poor work ethic that he perceives as pervasive.
The project is working on breaking these 'cycles of poverty', but it is difficult to work
against deeply engrained mentalities. In Carmichael's opinion, the training programs are
important, as they provide hope and direction, but the real issues are mental and cannot be
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overcome easily. Again, non-profits can play an important role in providing a 'hand up' to
the marginalized - helping them develop the skills and confidence for self-sufficiency - and
are thus a strength of the neoliberal approach. A weakness is that those that are truly
unable to attain full self-sufficiency still need care, and are potentially further marginalized
in a paradigm that perceives them as lazy and somewhat deserving of their plight.
Education can also provide an important path out of the aforementioned 'cycle of poverty',
but only if it is of good quality and being taken advantage of. Even public schooling is a de
facto market commodity in the United States, with the best schools typically in the
wealthiest communities and the worst in the poorest, which makes the cycle difficult to
break (Kozol 1991). This is an ironic weakness of the neoliberal approach, as the poor are
expected to lift themselves out of poverty, but are not given the tools to do so. In
Magnaville, Carmichael witnessed the low quality of the education system and the lack of
attention many parents, which are often high school dropouts themselves, were paying to
their children's education, so hired some retired teachers and instituted an after-school
program in which the youth receive remedial instruction, and assistance and
encouragement with their homework.
Service and resource provision
As mentioned previously, in the neoliberal paradigm, self-sufficiency is viewed as highly
important. The expectation is, therefore, that people will acquire goods and services almost
exclusively via exchange in the market. Again, this results in those with more resources
having greater access to a wealth of options. Post-Katrina, the government's emergency
response measures did provide some support, including food and blankets in emergency
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shelters, but they were widely criticized as grossly insufficient, and focused almost
exclusively on the short term, rather than long term wellbeing (Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006).
In Magnaville, residents are encouraged to plant small garden plots and tend small herds of
livestock in the name of greater self-sufficiency. The idea is that residents with low wages
can lower their grocery bills, and potentially earn some extra income, by growing some of
their own food and selling any surplus (Maggi 2007). This initiative has the side benefit of
improving diets with fresh and healthy foods.
Under the neoliberal framework, healthcare is also considered a largely private service,
most efficiently allocated via market mechanisms. A consequence of the market-based
approach is that the poor and uninsured have little or no coverage. This was identified as a
problem post-Katrina, as many of the most adversely effected received short-term
emergency care, but have not been able to access the longer-term care they need to fully
recover (Appleseed 2006).
Magnaville residents fortunately do have access to a free clinic about a half hour away, and
some local doctors are willing to provide services at reduced rates, but most residents are
ultimately uninsured and do not know how to access the free services they are entitled to.
Because of this, there are serious health issues in the community that remain unaddressed.
Mental health problems often overlap with poverty, and thus are all too common among
Magnaville residents. Recognizing this, Carmichael hired a social services worker with a
psychology background to work with residents.
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This overwhelming priority placed on self-sufficiency is in stark contrast to the scientific
management approach followed in Qinghai, in which the expectation is that the
government will essentially provide. The strength of self-sufficiency is that personal
resiliency is increased in the face of potential government shortcomings, and allows for
greater autonomy and personal choice. The weakness is that it appears to be fostered at the
cost of a sufficient safety net for the marginalized.
Cultural preservation and change
The decimation of areas like the Lower Ninth Ward undoubtedly had a negative impact on
the vibrant culture that existed pre-Katrina. Planning and development efforts in New
Orleans post-Katrina have been labeled as cultural gentrification by some, with accusations
that the government has explicitly and implicitly discouraged Black residents from
returning by favoring higher-end development, suspending affirmative action
requirements, and via a number of other decisions (Davis, Mike 2005).
Cultural change is also central to some resettlement options. In the case of Magnaville, the
strong cultural norms that have been constructed - with their agrarian undertones and
emphasis on Protestant notions of hard work and good behavior - are potentially quite
different than the traditional cultural norms of the resident population. Accusations have
been leveled at Magnaville that it is engaged in 'social engineering'. It is not clear, however,
that this is derogatory to the project team as introducing what they perceive as positive
social change - getting people on the 'right track' such that they are able to hold good jobs,
keep their children in school, have a home they are proud of and so on - is a primary goal.
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Interestingly, cultural homogenization - which was criticized as a weakness in China's
authoritarian approach - may be just as prevalent in the supposedly laissez-faire neoliberal
planning framework. Like it or not, citizens are expected to conform to the market's needs,
facing a great deal of pressure to become 'rational economic actors'. Furthermore, market
forces can and do lead to the gentrification of neighborhoods and subsequent displacement
of their traditional populations and thus micro-cultures.
Conclusion
The difficult question of whether or not rebuilding in New Orleans - and particularly in low-
lying areas like the Lower Ninth Ward - is appropriate must ultimately be asked. After all,
approximately half of the city is already below sea level, and many areas are subsiding
further; the Gulf Coast is notoriously prone to hurricanes; and rebuilding the levee
infrastructure is expensive with no guarantee it will adequately protect the city from future
storms (Burkett, Zilkoski and Hart 2003; Henderson 2005; Williams 2007). Some predict
that climate change is, and will continue to, only make matters worse. One of the most
significant weaknesses of the neoliberal approach is that - even if planners deem
resettlement (or 'selective rebuilding', as the ULI blue ribbon panel proposed) a suitable
response to risk - they are essentially powerless to impose it.
Another weakness with leaving the choice to rebuild or resettle to the markets is that this
can be inefficient from a resource allocation perspective; the city has to run services across
its entire former territory, for example, rather than focusing on zones deemed most
suitable for rebuilding (Henderson 2005). Unfortunately, there is no clear and shared view
of what should and should not be rebuilt, nor shared criteria against which this could be
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evaluated; the neoliberal approach does not condone discussion and decision-making
regarding these questions, as the presumption is that the market will best decide. This is
made more difficult in the context of climate change, because the specific impacts in any
given place are impossible to definitively project and the time horizons are often long and
also uncertain. A significant racial and class divide in New Orleans compounds the
challenge of collectively agreeing on whether or not to redevelop, as many perceive any
suggestion that the poorest, and hardest hit, areas should not be rebuilt as a nefarious
attempt to gentrify the city to the benefit of the corporate white elite and loss of the
majority black population (Reardon 2006).
As expected, a variety of responses emerged to Hurricane Katrina. Many are meeting the
needs of the displaced, particularly those with the resources to reestablish themselves
elsewhere or rebuild their homes in New Orleans. This ability to respond to climate change,
or any crisis, as one wishes is a strength of the neoliberal approach. Marginalized
populations have, however, had a more difficult time finding satisfactory options, which is a
weakness of this planning framework.
The amount of resources one has ultimately seems to be a better indicator of which option
one chooses, or has chosen for them. Those with the resources to rebuild in New Orleans
often do so, though some take their resources and rebuild elsewhere; those that cannot
rebuild, at least not immediately, but have employment and/or other opportunities in
other cities often resettle in them, at least temporarily; those that are willing and able to
live by the requirements of a non-profit initiative, and are fortunate enough to be selected,
will often take that route; and those that have nothing else often found themselves in FEMA
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trailer parks, and are still struggling. In other words, the element of choice - a core strength
of the neoliberal approach - is not accessible to all.
In the case of rebuilding privately, the choice can be quite personalized. In the case of
resettlement into a non-profit initiative, one must compromise to the typically dominant
mission and social change objectives of the project. In Magnaville, participants are buying
into Stronach's vision of what an optimal resettlement scheme should look like. Those
requiring resettlement have the choice of whether or not to participate, but are agreeing to
live by the project's rules, if they do.9
Self-sufficiency is seen as a priority under the neoliberal framework, and the supporting
objective of helping people get established and into the workforce is typically highlighted in
projects. The strength of emphasizing self-sufficiency is that it fosters resilience at the
individual level, lessening dependency on government planners that may not be able or
willing to meet everyone's needs in all cases. The weakness is that self-sufficiency is often
emphasized at the cost of a safety net for the most marginalized. Post-Katrina, the
government failed to protect the poor, leaving them in New Orleans without an adequate
emergency response plan, then failed to provide satisfactory housing and resettlement
options (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina 2006).
9 Magnaville's rules and social change objectives may sound particularly strong, but they are not so
different than Habitat for Humanity's requirements, including a commitment to home maintenance, ability
to pay and sweat equity.
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Chapter 6. Key observations + recommendations
In concurrence with the thesis of this paper, I conclude that both the more authoritarian
scientific management and market-oriented neoliberal approaches to planning have
strengths and weaknesses. The key observations drawn from each are presented in figure 3
for comparison.
Figure 3 - Key observations drawn from the case studies
Unite te.
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The authoritarian Chinese system's primary strength is that it is better able to proactively
respond to threats like climate change. Planners are empowered to make decisions,
resettling communities before they are extremely adversely impacted, and before they may
even realize that resettlement is necessary. In contrast, planners in the market-oriented
American system engage in very little proactive planning. Experts ominously forewarned of
the risks New Orleans faced for years, yet planners were essentially powerless to use this
information to force proactive responses. Even post-Katrina, mandated resettlement is an
extremely controversial idea, and thus off the table for the most part.
A weakness in the Chinese system is that decision-making is fairly opaque. Those being
resettled have very little access to information justifying their resettlement, or explaining
how they are being planned for. They also have no opportunity to participate in the
decision-making process, and little recourse if they disagree with decisions made on their
behalf. This makes the honesty and competency of planners, two elements that cannot be
taken for granted, all the more important. Participants are also unable to act on their
personal preferences, nor can they affect change based on their local knowledge of the
context. In the American system, most information is widely available - just not necessarily
known or used - and most decisions are left to the individual.
The market-oriented American approach's main strength is that it allows for a diversity of
responses from various for-profit, non-profit and government players, responding to
personal preferences. This diversity also promotes competition, which arguably leads to
quality improvements and innovation. Resources that are provided by the state often
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maximize the capacity for individual choice. An example is cash compensation for people to
rebuild where and how they wish, rather than rebuilding for them. In contrast, Chinese
resettlement follows a one-size-fits-all approach, in which those being resettled are treated
in a uniform way, placed in standardized housing and promised similar provisions. A
weakness with this approach is that the standardized offering is not necessarily ideal, or
even satisfactory, for all. In physical terms, the shelter provided is, for example, not
appropriate in all climatic conditions or for all families.
The American approach first and foremost expects people to resettle on their own, using
their own resources as they see fit. For those with insufficient resources, both the state and
private not-for-profits provide different options. The emphasis is still, however, on helping
people 'get back on their feet' so they can resume self-sufficiency. A weakness with this
approach is that - because they are deemed options of last resort - the organized
resettlement option the state provides, such as FEMA trailer parks, are arguably
unsatisfactory. Those least able to attain self-sufficiency are, therefore, typically left in the
most precarious situations. The alternatives non-profits provide - like Magnaville - can be
much more appealing, but residents typically must meet established criteria, be willing to
live by prescribed rules, and be fortunate enough to be chosen in order to participate. In
other words, exclusivity persists and is a weakness of the neoliberal approach.
On the other hand, the strength of the neoliberal approach is that self-sufficiency can
increase resiliency, lessening dependence on the state, which is always somewhat volatile.
The corresponding weakness with the Chinese approach is that those involved are made
highly dependent on the government's ability to provide; something the government is not
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always able to live up to. In the cases investigated, the government is not, for example,
providing heating and cooking fuel, despite the promises made.
Another distinction between the American and Chinese approaches is the
comprehensiveness of plans developed, and how rigidly they are followed. True to its
authoritarian scientific management framework, plans in China are comprehensive, and
dispatched with the expectation that they will be implemented literally. Two strengths of
this approach are that the best resources, both human and otherwise, can be used to devise
high-quality plans, and the successes and failures of local officials to fulfill the plans are
relatively easy to measure. A weakness is that there is little room to adapt plans to the local
context, and planners greatly removed from that context are arguably ignorant to its needs,
capacities and preferences. In the United States, it is harder to define a single approach, as
it varies by organization or project. This is a strength in and of itself, as all resources and
hopes are not devoted to a single approach that could fail. In the case of Magnaville, the
written plans are scant, and much more power is given to the management team to make
decisions based on ad hoc analysis. This allows for flexibility to contextual changes, but
requires that the planners (the project team) are competent and have the trust of their
superiors.
Any policy implications drawn from this analysis must recognize that overarching planning
frameworks are unlikely to radically change, but could be improved, responding to the
weaknesses and capitalizing on the strengths elucidated above. For this reason, many of the
below recommendations recognize, and are responsive to, these boundaries. Some are,
however, more normative in nature. Of course, these recommendations are only intended
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to point towards possibilities and areas for more research, based on the observations made
in these two case studies.
Bounded participatory decision-making
There are arguably instances in which it is in the public interest that planners make
decisive decisions, like mandating resettlement. The power of planners to do so in the
Chinese context is one of its strengths. The weakness of giving planners this power is that
individuals loose a degree of autonomy and must trust that planners are making the right
decisions, in their interest. To ameliorate the loss of autonomy, the related decisions that
follow - ranging from the logistics of resettlement to what their new homes will look like -
could be reverted back to the households involved. Engaging people in decision making,
while recognizing that there are times in which action needs to be mandated, also helps to
provide checks and balances on planners, and set clear limits on when they are and are not
expected to make decisive decisions more or less unilaterally.
In any context, community engagement may actually help planners make contentious but
necessary choices by avoiding or reducing community opposition. As noted previously,
whether or not to rebuild all of New Orleans was a controversial issue, with the initial
planning assessment indicating that redevelopment should be concentrated and some
areas left for parks and wetlands. The community was not engaged in reaching that
decision, however, and took it as an attack on their right to live in the city, leading to the
removal of the question from the table in favor of the potentially less suitable resolution to
allow people to rebuild anywhere (New Orleans Community Support Foundation 2007;
Whoriskey 2007a).
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It is not certain that a community engagement process would have led to a different
outcome, but it at least would have given the citizenry the opportunity to assess the
information themselves and reach an informed opinion. Residents deserve to be
empowered and to play a role in the planning process, but they should be given accurate
information and also made to take responsibility for difficult choices.
Information for decision-making
If resettlement is to be voluntary, getting information in the hands of the public is an
important part of the decision-making process. The complex and uncertain nature of
climate change makes the acquisition of the best information possible all the more
important. Neoliberalism assumes that all market participants - in this case, those choosing
between resettlement options - have perfect information to make rational choices. This
seems to be far from true at present, and may be impossible, but more information could be
aggregated and presented to the public to increase their level of understanding, leading to
better decisions.
In the more authoritarian Chinese approach to planning, the assumption is that planners
can and will acquire all relevant information and use it to make the best decisions for
communities. Planners can still, however, ameliorate suspicion and avoid opposition by
sharing the information and methodologies they are using to make decisions.
A hybrid approach in which planners and communities collectively make resettlement
planning decisions, or in which community perspectives weigh heavily on and are taken
seriously by planners, requires that they have a shared body of information everyone trusts
the veracity of. By involving community members in the question identification and
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information collection process, they are more likely to understand and trust the findings,
improving the quality of their participation in the resettlement itself. The information
analyzed can also help households make better choices in their own decision-making.
Following plans
An interesting distinction between planning in Qinghai and in Magnaville in particular is
the level of planning in advance, and adherence to plans developed. In Qinghai,
comprehensive plans are prepared at the national level and handed down to local planners
for strict implementation. Conversely, planning in Magnaville is highly dynamic, with
decisions regularly made on the fly by the highly trusted project team. The strength of the
Chinese approach is that very little trust and confidence has to be invested in local
planners; they are essentially expected to be automatons of the larger state. The strength of
the Magnaville approach is that the best solutions can be crafted on a case-by-case basis in
response to changing dynamics. Which approach is ultimately best is highly dependent on
the context, including how competent those implementing the plans are and the relative
fluidity of the factors at play. This dichotomy does, however, deserve attention.
Self-sufficiency and safety nets
Self-sufficiency is emphasized as a key objective of government agencies and non-profits in
post-Katrina resettlement. This is potentially at the cost of a safety net, as the
overwhelming expectation is that people can and should be responsible for themselves,
and thus any support mechanism is a minimal intervention to support that end, catching
those few that truly fall through the cracks while avoiding incentivizing free-riding. In
contrast, meeting a comprehensive set of needs - from housing to fuel - directly is stressed
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in resettlement planning in Qinghai, emphasizing the safety net over self-sufficiency. A
weakness of this approach is that it encourages dependency and can lead to problems
when the state is not able to meet needs. A healthy balance of a safety net and self-
sufficiency may be a more appropriate response, encouraging and supporting self-
sufficiency whenever possible, but ensuring that a robust safety net is in place for times
when individuals need to depend on it.
Fostering self-sufficiency through workforce participation is not easy. Labor markets are
extremely complex and, especially in capitalist economic systems, planners have few
methods at their disposal for intervening (Friedmann 1987). Make-work projects, like
those implemented in Magnaville, can keep people busy and build their skill sets and work
ethics, but they are typically not the most efficient and productive uses of that labor.
Innovative approaches, microfinance among them, may be considered. In Qinghai, one
interviewee suggested that capital should be invested in creating small businesses run by,
and employing, Tibetans. Creating a parallel economy may create employment
opportunities for resettled persons in areas with high unemployment, persistent prejudice
or other barriers to workforce participation. Two drawbacks are that the divisions between
the host and the arriving populations are strengthened; and, particularly if the receiving
population is poor and facing its own employment challenges, programs supporting
employment exclusively among the arriving population may foster jealousy and
resentment.
Ensuring that schooling is accessible to resettled children - and ideally adults too - is
essential to fostering self-sufficiency, especially given that different skills will likely be
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required of those resettled in their new environments. Planners and educators could also
do things to make school more attractive, like making the curricula more relevant to their
daily lives. 1'
Justice and equity issues
In the Qinghai case, there are very few disparities between those being resettled, as they
are all provided virtually the same style of home, similar subsidies and so on. This
homogeneity is expected under an authoritarian scientific management framework in
which planners devise the 'optimal' solution and implement it universally.
In contrast, a significant weakness of the American approach is that there are major
disparities along class and racial lines in how people are resettling post-Katrina. The
wealthy are able to rebuild in New Orleans or elsewhere relatively quickly, while the poor
found - and in some cases still find - themselves isolated in sub-standard conditions in
FEMA trailer parks (Davis, Belinda Creel and Bali 2006). Ensuring that an adequate safety
net is in place could ameliorate this weakness. Disparities between rich and poor are
unlikely to disappear in the American context, but softening the impacts on the poorest by
ensuring that their basic needs are being met is arguably possible. Better planning could go
a long way towards achieving this; after all, the shortcomings post-Katrina were not
necessarily due to a lack of resources, but rather an uncoordinated and reactionary
response that did little to address long-term environmental change or socio-economic
problems.
10 For example, one of the Qinghai interviewees, Wenchangjia Namgyal (2009), is currently working on an
English language textbook geared towards Tibetan students with the goal of making it more accessible to
and interesting for them.
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The element of choice prescribed under the market rationalist planning framework has
strengths, as it allows individuals to optimize their happiness and wellbeing by making
unique decisions based on their unique preferences. It can, however, result in a variety of
satisfactory choices for those with resources and no satisfactory choices for those without,
exacerbating inequalities. As noted previously, the government attempted to ameliorate
this problem while still allowing for choice post-Katrina by providing those displaced with
cash payments to use as they see fit. This is a logical response but was not entirely
successful, as the amounts the poor and marginalized received were often insufficient.
Furthermore, markets were not working well, with real estate prices inflated and many of
the poorest unable to access satisfactory solutions (Appleseed 2006; Davis, Belinda Creel
and Bali 2006; Rose, Clark and Duval-Diop 2008). Ensuring that the needs of the
marginalized are met is arguably a key role for planners. This may require the provision of
different responses for groups with different levels of access to resources.
The exclusivity of certain resettlement options further complicates matters. It is typically
the most marginalized and least functional that are unable to meet the standards required
of a project like Magnaville - whether it be due to a criminal record or the inability to hold
down a job - and thus get further marginalized by a lack of resettlement options.
Market corruptions
The neoliberal American approach to planning is premised on the notion that markets are
allowed to operate with minimal obstruction so they can ultimately transmit the correct
signals, leading to the Pareto optimal outcome in the long term. In practice, corruptions like
government-backed insurance may be sending the wrong signals, permitting people to
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rebuild in areas in which an unfettered insurance market would either refuse to cover them
or charge exorbitant premiums, signaling that it is not appropriate. If markets are deemed
the primary vehicle for decision-making and the conveyance of information, it is important
that corruptions like this are identified and removed.
The roles of the public, for-profit and non-profit sectors
Nomadic resettlement in Qinghai and post-Katrina resettlement in the United States sit at
opposite extremes in terms of the extent of direct government involvement, which is not
surprising given the very different planning frameworks each is taking place within. Post-
Katrina, the majority of the responses have been private, both profit-oriented (e.g. using
insurance claims to hire a contractor to build a new home) and non-profit (e.g. Magnaville).
Magnaville is almost exclusively a private venture, fully funded by corporate donations and
implemented by a non-governmental project team."1 At the other end of the spectrum, the
government is virtually the sole planner and implementer in the Qinghai resettlement
initiative.
Both government and non-profit organizations bring strengths and weaknesses to
resettlement planning. Governments carry the legal authority to mandate changes when
necessary, typically have access to broader funding, and are expected to look out for the
interests of all community members. They are, however, often saddled with cumbersome
bureaucracies and are not always the most responsive to individual communities. Non-
profit organizations are typically more flexible, free to take positions on issues and
11 According to Carmichael (2009), the only government support has been funding for very small one-off
projects, like a computer-training program.
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advocate for them, and are often closer to their constituencies. They do not, however,
always keep the interests of the broader community in mind, may be exclusive in terms of
who they work with, and often lack the resources that governments have.
Other cases would suggest that the best approaches to resettlement involve both
government and non-governmental organizations, each doing what they do best. In a case
of involuntary resettlement in Mumbai, for example, non-profit organizations were
extremely effective in mobilizing the community, educating them, and ensuring that their
needs and perspectives were taken into account. The government appropriately responded
to these efforts, and ultimately provided the necessary resources and led project
implementation (See Patel, d'Cruz and Burra 2002).
Non-profits can also play important roles in supporting service provision. They may, for
example, be well suited to provide job training and cultural preservation initiatives. In
Qinghai, the government does allow non-profits to operate, but with limited scopes and
inadequate support. Further supporting, partnering with and permitting them may be an
efficient way to foster more effective programming. Conversely, it can be argued that some
roles are better left to the state, even in non-profit-led resettlement projects. In the case of
Magnaville, the project is ill equipped to provide healthcare, for example, a service that the
government is perhaps better able to provide.
Learning from past experiences
The concept of CCIR is fairly nascent; norms and best practices have yet to emerge. Much
can be learned from case studies such as those examined in this paper partly because they
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offer good approximations of what we can expect with CCDPs under different planning
frameworks and conditions.
While far from perfect, much can also be learned from traditional resettlement practices.
Appendix 4 examines three existing forms of resettlement - involuntary taking-based
resettlement, refugee self-reliance, and slum resettlement - that may be instructive as
CCDPs increase in number and norms in planning for them are developed. It is, however,
notable that all three of these approaches to resettlement arguably fall into the scientific
management paradigm, as they prescribe strong roles for planners.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
The balance of evidence suggests that the impacts of climate change are upon us, and we
need to redouble our planning efforts now. In most cases, adaptation is expected to involve
the construction and strengthening of infrastructure and changes in our modus operandi to
protect our existing settlements. Unfortunately, in some cases the impacts are expected to
be more profound, requiring that communities completely resettle. In preparation for an
increase in CCIR, we need to start considering how different approaches to planning shape
the resettlement process, and which broad approaches are best suited to both the planning
and implementation of resettlement programs.
This thesis examined two different cases of resettlement that are situated within very
different overarching planning frameworks: The resettlement of Tibetan nomads in
western China, which is planned within a strong authoritarian scientific management
framework; and resettlement planning in New Orleans post-Hurricane Katrina, which is
nested with a broader neoliberal, market-oriented framework.
The overarching conclusion reached is that both planning frameworks bring strengths and
weakness to planning for CCIR. China's authoritarian approach is widely criticized in the
West as undemocratic. It may, however, be better able to address a unique problem - the
long-term nature of climate change, and uncertainty around when to resettle and when to
stay - than the laissez faire market-oriented approach of the United States. This is due to
the ability of planners in the Chinese system to proactively assess climate change-related
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trends and make decisions. Information is analyzed and plans are devised and introduced
with minimal interaction with communities.
The serious shortcomings with the Chinese approach must, however, be acknowledged.
Plans are comprehensive and generic, with little or no sensitivity to individual preference,
or differing conditions and needs. Planners are also greatly empowered, which can lead to
exploitation for their own personal gain, or for the perpetuation of the status quo, against
the interests of those being planned for. This approach also neglects self-sufficiency in
favor of a strong safety net, potentially breeding dependency. On the other hand, another
advantage of the Chinese approach is that resettlement options are typically made
accessible to all, regardless of relative wealth; everyone's needs are, at least theoretically,
addressed.
In contrast, the market-oriented response post-Hurricane Katrina leaves most decisions in
private hands. Planning is thus inherently reactive and planners and experts are often
ignored. Despite information suggesting that rebuilding in certain areas of New Orleans is
not advisable, for example, personal preference is given priority and thus rebuilding
proceeds. On the other hand, the American approach does allow for individual choice, and
thus, at least potentially the most suitable response at the household level.
A variety of options have indeed emerged to meet varying preferences and capabilities.
Another shortcoming post-Katrina is however, that not everyone's needs are necessarily
being met satisfactorily. Those with more resources are able to essentially buy the best
responses, while the poorest are often marginalized in poor conditions. Non-profit
organizations have emerged as important players in the provision of resettlement options,
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but they can be exclusive, working only with households that meet their criteria. They also
tend to have a limited capacity.
Policy implications drawn from this analysis were identified in the last chapter. They
include: How public engagement in decision-making might be bounded within a proactive
decision to resettle made by planners; the importance of sharing commonly supported
information; balancing self-sufficiency and adequate safety nets; the need to promote
justice and equity; the presence of market corruptions in the neoliberal approach;
balancing public and private stakeholders; and how other, more established, resettlement
systems can be learned from. These are areas deserving of attention moving forward, as the
nascent field of planning for CCIR emerges.
Page 85 of 111

Works Cited
Adams, N. (2006, August 29). "Recovery Is Slow for FEMA Trailer Park Residents." NPR.org
Retrieved May 16, 2009, from
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 5733589.
Amundsen, 1. (1999). Political Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues. Working Papers.
Bergen, Norway, Chr. Michelsen Institute. WP 1999: 7.
Andrews, E. L. (2008, October 23). "Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation." The New
York Times B1. New York.
Appleseed (2006). A Continuing Storm: The On-Going Struggles of Hurricane Katrina
Evacuees. Minneapolis, Appleseed.
Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (2008). Human Rights and
Climate Change (Background Paper).
Baum, H. S. (1988). "Planning Theory as Political Practice." Society November/December:
35-42.
Bernstein, L., P. Bosch, O. Canziani, Z. Chen, R. Christ, 0. Davidson, W. Hare, S. Huq, D.
Karoly, V. Kattsov, Z. Kundzewicz, J. Liu, U. Lohmann, M. Manning, T. Matsuno, B.
Menne, B. Metz, M. Mirza, N. Nicholls, L. Nurse, R. Pachauri, J. Palutikof, M. Parry, D.
Qin, N. Ravindranath, A. Reisinger, J. Ren, K. Riahi, C. Rosenzweig, M. Rusticucci, S.
Schneider, Y. Sokona, S. Solomon, P. Stott, R. Stouffer, T. Sugiyama, R. Swart, D.
Tirpak, C. Vogel and G. Yohe (2007). Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report IPCC
Fourth Assessment Report, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Biermann, F. and I. Boas (2008). "Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global
Protocol." Environment 50(6/November-December): 8-17.
Board on Health Care Services and Institute of Medicine (2004). Insuring America's Health:
Principles and Recommendations. Washington, The National Academies Press.
Bohrer, B. (2007, July 1). "Rural haven." The Columbus Dispatch Columbus, Ohio.
Brown, L. R. (2007, July 1). "Climate Refugees' Growing Tab." USA Today
Brown, 0. (2008). Migration and Climate Change. IOM Migration Research Series. Geneva,
International Organization for Migration. No. 31.
Burkett, V. R., D. B. Zilkoski and D. A. Hart (2003). Sea-Level Rise and Subsidence:
Implications for Flooding in New Orleans, Louisiana. U.S. Geological Survey
Subsidence Interest Group Conference. Proceedings of the Technical Meeting.
Galveston, Texas.
Page 87 of 111
Byravan, S. and S. C. Rajan (2006). "Providing new homes for climate change exiles."
Climate Policy 6(2): 247-252.
Campbell, H. and R. Marshall (1999). "Ethical Frameworks and Planning Theory."
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 23(3): 464-478.
Carmichael, S. (2009, April 9). Magnaville Project Manager. Telephone interview.
Magnaville, Simmesport, LA.
China Tibet Information Center. (2001, October 15). "The Development-oriented Poverty
Reduction Program for Rural China." Retrieved April 13, 2009, from
http://eng.tibet.cn/politics/report/200801/t20080116 354760.htm.
Conisbee, M. and A. Simms (2003). Environmental Refugees: The Case for Recognition.
London, New Economics Foundation.
Cutter, S. L., C. T. Emrich, J. T. Mitchell, B. J. Boruff, M. Gall, M. C. Schmidtlein, C. G. Burton
and G. Melton (2006). "The Long Road Home: Race, Class, and Recovery from
Hurricane Katrina." Environment 48(2): 9-20.
Davis, B. C. and V. Bali (2006). Not in My District: The Placement of FEMA Trailer Parks.
Sixth Annual State Politics and Policy Conference. Texas Tech University-Lubbock.
Davis, M. (2005, October 25). "Gentrifying Disaster." Mother Jones Retrieved May 16, 2009,
from http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2005 /10/gentrifying-disaster.
Dewan, S. (2009, May 8). "Ready or Not, Katrina Victims Lose Temporary Housing." The
New York Times A18. New York.
FEMA. (2007, March). "Myths and Facts about the National Flood Insurance Program."
Retrieved May 16, 2009, from
lhttp: //www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id= 3002.
Friedman, L. (2009a). "Facing the specter of the globe's biggest and harshest mass
journeys." Bangladesh: Where the climate exodus begins Retrieved March 15, 2009,
from http://www.eenews.net/special reports/bangladesh/part one.
Friedman, L. (2009b). "Preparing to confront the unknowable." Bangladesh: Where the
climate exodus begins Retrieved March 15, 2009, from
http://www.eenews.net/special reports/bangladesh/part one sidebar.
Friedmann, J. (1987). Planning in the Public Domain. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University
Press.
Friends of the Earth Australia (2007). A Citizen's Guide to Climate Refugees.
Glaeser, E. L. (2005). "Should the Government Rebuild New Orleans, Or Just Give Residents
Checks?" The Economists' Voice 2(4): Article 4.
Page 88 of 111
Greater London Authority (2008). The London climate change adaptation strategy - Draft
report.
Harford, T. (2006, June 17). "It's the humanity, stupid: Gary Becker has lunch with the FT."
The Undercover Economist Retrieved May 16, 2009, from
http://timharford.com/2006/06/its-the-humanity-stupid-gary-becker-has-lunch-
with-the-ft/.
Henderson, J. (2005, September 26). "Thoughts On Rebuilding (And Not Rebuilding) New
Orleans." Planetzien Retrieved April 15, 2009, from
http://www.planetizen.com/node/17467.
Hodgkinson, D., T. Burton, A. Coram, S. Dawkins and L. Young (2009). "Towards a
convention for persons displaced by climate change: Key issues and preliminary
responses." IOP Conference Series: Earth and Envirionmental Science 6(562014).
Huatsebum. (2009, January 19). Resettled family. Personal interview. Wonskor, Qinghai,
China.
Hughes, T. P. (2004). American genesis: a century of invention and technological
enthusiasm, 1870-1970. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Human Rights Watch (2007). "No One Has the Liberty to Refuse": Tibetan Herders Forcibly
Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region. New York,
Human Rights Watch.
International Finance Corporation (2002). Handbook for Preparing a Resettlement Action
Plan. Washington, International Finance Corporation.
Jervis, R. (2007, August 29). "2 years after Katrina, pace of rebuilding depends on who
pays." USA Today
Johnstone, L. C. (2008). Planning for the Inevitable, the Humanitarian Consequences of
Climate Change UNHCR.
Kozol, J. (1991). Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools. New York, Harper
Perennial.
Lohr, K. (2009, April 30). "Residents In Limbo As FEMA Trailer Deadline Looms." All Things
Considered - NPR.org Retrieved May 16, 2009, from
http: //www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=103653780.
Lopez, A. (2007). "The Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International
Law." Environmental Law 37(2): 365-409.
Lydersen, K. (2009, Sunday, February 15). "Scientists: Pace of Climate Change Exceeds
Estimates." The Washington Post A03. Washington.
Page 89 of 111
Maggi, L. (2007, December 9). "For some N.O. evacuees, Canadaville a dream that's come
true." The Times-Picayune New Orleans.
Make It Right. (2009). "Make It Right Foundation." Retrieved April 15, 2009, from
http: //www.makeitrightnola.org/.
Marx, K. (1875). Critique of the Gotha Programme. Marx/Engels Selected Works. Moscow,
Progress Publishers. 3: 13-30.
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (2006). Finland's National Adaptation Strategy - An
integral part of the National Energy and Climate Strategy. Government of Finland.
Mkhargyal. (2009, January 18). Resettled family. Personal interview. Goma Township,
Qinghai, China.
Mukheibir, P. and G. Ziervogel (2006). Framework for Adaptation to Climate Change in the
City of Cape Town Environment Resource Management. City of Capetown.
Myers, N. (1993). "Environmental Refugees in a Globally Warmed World." BioScience
43(11): 752-761.
Namgyal, W. (2007). Livelihood strategies among Tibetan pastoralists before and after
resettlement and privatization. Manila, Ateneo de Manila University Master in
Applied Sociology & Anthropology.
Namgyal, W. (2009, January 19). Lecturer/resident. Personal interview. Wonskor, Qinghai,
China.
New Orleans Community Support Foundation. (2007). "UNOP: The Unified New Orleans
Plan." Retrieved April 15, 2009, from http://www.unifiedneworleansplan.coni.
Ni, J. (2000). "A simulation of biomes on the Tibetan Plateau and their responses to global
climate change." Mountain Research and Development 20(1): 80-89.
Oreskes, N. (2004). "Beyond the ivory tower - The scientific consensus on climate change."
Science 306(5702): 1686-1686.
Patel, S., C. d'Cruz and S. Burra (2002). "Beyond evictions in a global city: people-managed
resettlement in Mumbai." Environment & Urbanization 14(1): 159-172.
Pei, M. (2006, April 9). "The dark side of China's dazzling economic boom: Hype conceals
often sordid reality of government corruption and cronyism." San Francisco
Chronicle El. San Francisco.
Penkyi. (2007, March 2). "Comfortable housing and happy lives of Tibetan farmers and
herders." China Tibet Information Center Retrieved April 13, 2009, from
http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200801/t20080116 337216.htm.
Page 90 of 111
People's Daily. (2008, October 15). "Resettlement plan for Sichuan's Tibetan herdsmen
launched." China Tibet Information Center Retrieved April 13, 2009, from
http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today200810 /t20081015 432580.htm.
Piguet, E. (2008). Research Paper No. 153 - Climate change and forced migration New
Issues in Refugee Research. Geneva, UNHCR.
Reardon, K. M. (2006). "The Shifting Landscape of New Orleans." Shelterforce (Spring
2006).
Rose, K., A. Clark and D. Duval-Diop (2008). A Long Way Home: The State of Housing
Recovery in Louisiana. New Orleans, PoliyLink.
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane
Katrina (2006). A Failure of Initiative. Washington, U.S. House of Representatives.
Shafer, J. (2005, September 7). "Don't Refloat: The case against rebuilding the sunken city
of New Orleans." Slate Magazine Retrieved May 19, 2009, from
http://www.slate.com/id/2125810/.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1991). The Invisible Hand and Modern Welfare Economics. Cambridge, MA,
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). NBER Working Paper No. W3641
Taylor, F. W. (1911). The Principles of Scientific Management. New York, W. W. Norton &
Company.
The Road Home Program. (2007). "The Road Home." Retrieved April 29, 2009, from
http://www.road21a.org/.
Tseden. (2009, January 14). Resettled family. Personal interview. Dobdain Township,
Qinghai, China.
Tuhus-Dubrow, R. (2009, March 1). "Learning from Slums." Boston Globe Boston.
U.N. Wire. (1999, August 19). "Gov't Detains Critics Of Resettlement Plan." Retrieved April
16, 2009, from http://www.unwire.org/unwire/19990819/4446 story.asp.
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. (2009). "Hurricane Katrina." Disasters and
Emergencies Retrieved April 14, 2009, from
http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/emergency/naturaldisasters/hurricanes/katrina/in
dex.html.
UN Habitat. (2008, August 21). "Slum Upgrading Facility." Retrieved April 17, 2009, from
http://www.unhabitat.org/categories.asp?catid=542.
UNFCCC (2007). Climate Change: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Adaptation in Developing
Countries. Bonn, Germany, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change.
Page 91 of 111
UNHCR (2003). Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern.
Core Group on Durable Solutions. Geneva, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
UNHCR (2005). Handbook for Self-reliance. Geneva, Reintegration and Local Settlement
Section, Division of Operational Support, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.
UNHCR (2006). The UNHCR Tool for Participatory Assessment in Operations. Geneva,
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
UNHCR (2007). The 1951 Refugee Convention: Questions & Answers. Geneva, UNHCR
Media Relations and Public Information Service.
UNHCR. (2008, October 23). "Climate change, natural disasters and human displacement: A
UNHCR perspective "
United Nations Development Programme (2007). Human Development Report 2007/2008.
Basingstoke, UK and New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Wang. (2009, January 21). Qinghai Resettlement Office Engineer. Personal interview. Xining,
Qinghai, China.
Warrick, J. and P. Whoriskey. (2006, March 25). "Army Corps Is Faulted on New Orleans
Levees: Panel Says Studies Foresaw Failure, Urges New Scrutiny." The Washington
Post A06. Washington.
West Seti Hydro Limited (2008). Resettlement Plan: Reservoir Area and Downstream
Project Components West Seti Hydroelectric Project Environmental Impact
Assessment. Kathmandu, Nepal, West Seti Hydro Limited. 3.
Whoriskey, P. (2007a, January 4). "New Orleans Repeats Mistakes as It Rebuilds."
Washington Post A01. Washington.
Whoriskey, P. (2007b, March 12). "'We Called It Hurricane FEMA'." The Washington Post
A01. Washington.
Wikiquote. (2009, April 6). "John Emerich Edward Dalberg Acton, 1st Baron Acton."
Retrieved May 14, 2009, from http://en.wikiguote.org/wiki/John Dalberg-
Acton, 1st Baron Acton.
Williams, L. (2007, April 21). "Higher Ground." The Times-Picayune New orleans.
World Bank (2004). Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook. Washington, World Bank
Publications.
World Bank. (2007, March). "Ext Opmanual - OP 4.12 - Involuntary Resettlement."
Retrieved April 16, 2009, from http://go.worldbank.org/6416NBIY90.
Page 92 of 111
World Bank. (2009). "Involuntary Resettlement - Key Documents." Retrieved April 16,
2009, from http://go.worldbank.org/WC2CFQFBAO.
World Health Organization. (2009). "WHO Climate Change and Health Programme
Activities." Retrieved February 22, 2009, from
http://www.who.int/globalchange/climate/activities/en/index.html.
Xinhua. (2009, February 24). "Tibetans celebrate the coming new year." China Tibet
Information Center Retrieved March 10, 2009, from
http://eng.tibet.cn/news/today/200902/t20090224 454403.htm.
Page 93 of 111

Appendix 1- Interview process
Qinghai, China
I had the opportunity to travel to Qinghai Province, China, in January of 2009 to visit
resettled and traditional communities. My research involved interviews with two recently
resettled families in two different government-built resettlement communities - the
Tseden family in Dobdain Township, which partially resettled from the traditionally
nomadic Normgo Village in 2008, and the Mkhargyal family in Goma Township, which
resettled from the Wonskor Village's original site in the path of a Yangtze River reservoir in
2006/7 (Mkhargyal 2009; Tseden 2009). Mr. Wang, an engineer and government official
responsible for the six different village resettlements in Goma, was also interviewed (Wang
2009). Finally, I interviewed the Huatsebum family and Wenchangjia Namgyal, which
resettled from the Wonskor village's original site to a new rural site provided by the
government, on which they constructed their own home, when the aforementioned
Yangtze dam was first constructed in 1986 (Huatsebum 2009; Namgyal 2009). Namgyal is
particularly of interest, as he is a university lecturer that wrote his own masters thesis on
the resettlement of nomadic Tibetan communities.
My objective was to gain a better understanding of how the resettlement process -
particularly the contemporary round of resettlement to government-constructed
communities - is proceeding. I wished to identify what problems are emerging or
persisting, what programs are being implemented to address these problems, and
subsequently consider how the planning approach being followed fits with and varies from
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what might be expected given China's authoritarian scientific management planning
framework. The survey protocols followed are attached as Appendices 2 + 3. The first is the
protocol followed with Mr. Wang, the planner, and the second is the one followed with
community members interviewed.
United States post-Hurricane Katrina
I had the opportunity to interview Shane Carmichael, the Project Manager for Magnaville
(2009). Information and insights he provided form the foundation of the Magnaville
analysis, supported by an extensive review of media coverage. The survey protocol I
followed with Carmichael is attached as Appendix 2.
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Appendix 2 - Interview protocol for project planners
Interview protocol
Resettlement Communities
Interviewer: Todd Schenk
Interviewees: Community Planners and/or leaders
These interviews will be conducted orally either directly or via translators in resettlement
communities. I will start by having the translator read the following statement to
interviewees:
The purpose of this study is to identify best practices in permanent resettlement
communities, particularly those that are the product of environmental change. The
questions asked are designed to better understand what policies, programs and/or
technologies you are implementing to meet the needs of this community. Your
participation is completely voluntary; you may decline to answer any or all questions,
and end the interview at any point with no adverse consequences. If you wish, your
confidentially may also be protected; you have the option of having your name, the
name of this settlement, or both excluded from the record of this interview. If you wish
to be anonymous, you will be identified simply as a leader or manager from the
community.
1. Settlement name and location?
2. What is your position/job title?
3. How old is this settlement?
4. Why was it created? Where did the residents come from?
5. How long have you been working in this community for?
6. What is your background (past experience, education)?
7. Could you describe the planning process that was followed to site this community and
get it established?
8. What services were planned prior to the arrival of residents? Is there a standard
planning model you followed and/or continue to follow?
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9. How have you modified these services from the original plan since residents moved in?
Are they adequate/meeting needs?
10. What services should have been planned before residents arrived, but were neglected?
How have you been meeting these shortcomings?
11. What would you say are the main problems residents face?
12. What is being done to solve these problems? Who is conducting these programs?
13. Do you feel that that these programs are effective? Why or why not?
14. What are the limitations preventing more/better programs?
15. If not mentioned: In your opinion, is there a housing problem? How are you addressing
it? How would you address differently if you could? What is preventing this?
16. If not mentioned: In your opinion, is lack of employment opportunities a problem? How
are you addressing it? How would you address differently if you could? What are the
limiting factors?
17. If not mentioned: Is there a fuel shortage? How are you addressing it? How would you
address differently if you could? What are the limiting factors?
18. If not mentioned: Is there a food shortage? How are you addressing it? How would you
address differently if you could? What are the limiting factors?
19. If not mentioned: Do you feel that the health of community members has improved or
declined since moving here? Do you have any indicators of changes in health? Why do
you think this is? How are health problems being addressed? Would you do something
differently if you could? What are the limiting factors?
20. If not mentioned: What about water and sanitation? How do residents access fresh
water? What about sanitation? Do you feel that these services are adequate? If not, is
this being addressed? How would you address differently if you could? What are the
limiting factors?
21. If not mentioned: Do you think the natural environment is deteriorating? Do you feel
that this settlement is contributing to the deterioration or counteracting it? What makes
you feel this way? What is being done to protect the natural environment?
22. If not mentioned: What about traditional culture? Do you feel that the traditions of
residents are deteriorating due to the lifestyle changes? What, if anything, is being done
to keep them alive?
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23. Do you feel that this community is robust in the face of climatic events, including
further desertification, global warming and/or water shortages? What are the major
stresses?
24. How are decisions made here in the community? Who decides what projects take place?
Do you involve community members in decision making? How?
25. Do you inform community members of the decisions being made? How?
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Appendix 3 - Interview protocol for resettled community member
Interview protocol
Resettlement Communities
Interviewer: Todd Schenk
Interviewees: Community members
These interviews will be conducted orally either directly or via translators when necessary. I
will start by having the translator read the following statement to interviewees:
The purpose of this study is to understand what policies, programs and/or technologies
are being used to improve your standard of living and the sustainability of your
livelihood; how effective or ineffective these programs are at solving the problems you
identify; and to collect your thoughts on what programs, policies or technologies might
better meet your needs. Your participation is completely voluntary; you may decline to
answer any or all questions, and end the interview at any point with no adverse
consequences. Your confidentially shall also be protected; the place and date of this
interview will be recorded in the interview notes, but not your name or any other
information that will identify you personally.
1. Settlement name and location?
2. How long have you been in this community for?
3. What were your reasons for moving here?
4. What have been the benefits of settling?
5. What have been the disadvantages?
6. Do you see you and your descendants staying here permanently? Why or why not?
7. What would you say are the main problems you and your neighbors face?
8. What is being done to solve these problems? Who is conducting these programs?
9. Do you feel that that these programs are effective? Why or why not?
10. What would you do differently?
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11. If not mentioned: Are you happy with your shelter? In your opinion, is there a housing
problem? How is it being addressed? By whom? How would you address it differently?
12. If not mentioned: What about unemployment programs? In your opinion, is lack of
employment opportunities a problem? How is it being addressed? By whom? How
would you address differently?
13. If not mentioned: What about fuel? Is there a fuel shortage? How is it being addressed?
By whom? How would you address differently?
14. If not mentioned: What about food? Is there a food shortage? How is it being addressed?
By whom? How would you address differently?
15. If not mentioned: What about health problems? Do you feel that the health of your
family and neighbors has improved or declined since moving here? Why do you think
this is? How are health problems being addressed? BY whom? Would you do something
differently?
16. If not mentioned: What about water and sanitation? How do you get you water? What
about sanitation? Do you feel that these services are adequate? If not, is this being
addressed? By whom? How would you address differently?
17. If not mentioned: Do you think the natural environment is deteriorating? Do you feel
your lifestyle is contributing to the deterioration or counteracting it? Compared to your
past, nomadic, lifestyle? What makes you feel this way?
18. If not mentioned: What about your traditional culture? Do you feel that your traditions
are deteriorating due to the lifestyle changes? What makes you feel this way? What, if
anything, is being done to keep them alive?
19. How are decisions made here in the community? Who decides what projects take place?
20. Have you been consulted regarding what your needs are and/or what solutions are
being implemented? If so, how?
21. Do you feel informed about what is happening in your community? If so, how are you
informed?
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Appendix 4 - Learning from conventional resettlement
Involuntary resettlement (takings)
The practice of resettling into planned communities is not new. Despite its dubious history,
there is much we can learn from the wealth of case studies and literature on planned
resettlement. The literature on takings-related 'involuntary resettlement' - typically people
moved because a planned project requires or will disrupt the land they currently inhabit -
is particularly relevant, as planning for the mass resettlement of CCDPs will often be
somewhat similar.12
No doubt motivated by resistance to and failures with past resettlement programs -
including the infamous Narmada River dams project in India and Three Gorges project in
China - the World Bank has developed an Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement
that projects it supports are subjected to (World Bank 2007). The Bank and many of its
sister organizations, including the World Commission on Dams, have also prepared a
wealth of case studies and reports on the topic (See World Bank 2009).
The Bank's Operational Policy on Involuntary Resettlement notes that unplanned for
displacement can lead to serious economic, social and environmental problems as peoples'
lives are up-ended. For this reason, one of its core objectives is (World Bank 2007):
12 Resettlement planning for CCDPs does have some characteristics that make it different than
conventional takings-based resettlement. For one thing, it is not clear that resettlement will be involuntary,
at least not in all cases.
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Where it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, resettlement activities should be
conceived and executed as sustainable development programs, providing sufficient
investment resources to enable the persons displaced by the project to share in
project benefits. Displaced persons should be meaningfully consulted and should
have opportunities to participate in planning and implementing resettlement
programs.
Borrowers are required to take a number of more specific measures in order to meet this
objective; these include the provision of assistance with the physical act of moving itself,
housing and land at least equal in quality to that taken, support with resettlement for a
transition period, and transparency in that resettlement plans are made available to those
impacted in languages and formats they can access (World Bank 2007). The Policy notes
that marginalized groups deserve and require additional attention, and that lifestyles
should be disrupted as little as possible.
Borrowers are required to file Resettlement Plans and Resettlement Policy Frameworks to
demonstrate to the Bank how they plan to properly manage any resettlement (World Bank
2007). Several examples and templates of these instruments are available online (See
World Bank 2009). The Bank's comprehensive Involuntary Resettlement Sourcebook is a
veritable how-to guide on plan making and implementation (World Bank 2004). The
International Finance Corporation has also developed a related Handbook for Preparing a
Resettlement Action Plan (2002).
The West Seti Hydroelectric Project, Reservoir Area and Downstream Project Components
resettlement plan submitted for an Asian Development Bank-funded project in Nepal is
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typical of those submitted for large or medium-sized projects (it is estimated that
approximately 2,400 households will be impacted and 1,400 will require resettlement). At
over 300 pages, the plan profiles the impacted communities; outlines exactly how their
lifestyles will be altered and what efforts are being made to mitigate; enumerates how
communities are being consulted; explains how, and where, alternative land is being
acquired and distributed for resettlement; outlines how compensation will be calculated;
and so on (West Seti Hydro Limited 2008). The plan prescribes livelihood restoration and
community development initiatives, and includes provisions for landless households
impacted.
Of course, plans like these can be broadly interpreted, are often simply ignored, and in no
way ensure that resettlement will be a success (Patel, d'Cruz and Burra 2002). The Chinese
government promised to allow scrutiny of its resettlement plans in Qinghai Province, for
example, but allegedly arrested individuals it accused of conducting an 'illegal
investigation' into the World Bank-funded project (U.N. Wire 1999).
Nevertheless, similar processes may be appropriate in the context of planning for CCDPs,
and thus warrant examination. Should a protocol addressing how planning for CCDPs
should be conducted at the local level be proposed, or international organizations working
in the area desire a policy governing their project implementation, this Operational Policy
could serve as a valuable model.
More generally, some of the requirements the Bank's process prescribes - including the
thorough assessment of the communities impacted and comprehensive community
engagement processes - should be applied to CCDP resettlement too.
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Refugee self-reliance
There are obvious similarities between CCDPs and conventional refugees, in that both are
displaced. The major difference is that the primary objective in most conventional refugee
and IDP situations is to stabilize their homelands and return populations as quickly and
smoothly as possible. Their care is thus considered in terms of short-term emergency
management, not resettlement.
In practice, however, two-thirds of refugees have been in camps more than ten years and
some families have been displaced for generations (UNHCR 2005). In many cases, the
rights of these refugees to seek gainful employment, move freely, receive education, grow
their own food, improve their shelters and do many other things are restricted by rules
their host countries impose. In other cases logistical limitations, ranging from lack of
employment opportunities to fear of safety, restrict their abilities.
Recognizing that keeping refugees in a persistent state of dependence and restricting their
self-sufficiency and rights is exacting a real toll in terms of their personal development,
sense of worth and purpose, and community health - not to mention the financial and
technical costs to host countries and supporting agencies - the UNHCR developed a
Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern (2003). The
Framework prioritizes increasing self-reliance among refugee communities by providing
development assistance that leads to self-sustaining livelihoods and puts greater agency in
the hands of residents.
The UNHCR's Handbook for Self-reliance (2005) is one document providing guidance as to
how greater self-sufficiency can be fostered. It promotes the creation of broader self-
Page 106 of 111
reliance strategies that set goals and establish processes for the identification and initiation
of self-reliance projects, building off of the service gaps, capacities and wishes identified
among, and in partnership with, target communities.
The Handbook also prescribes tasks for the design and implementation of specific projects,
which include (UNHCR 2005: Book 2, 3): "Understand the context, the actors, and the
development priorities"; "Ensure host governments are appraised, supportive and
participate fully"; "Plan and help coordinate joint assessments"; "Seek/promote medium
and long term employment opportunities"; and "Ensure joint monitoring systems are
established and used". Specific implementation guidelines and links to further resources
are provided for each. The Handbook recommends that clear benchmarks and indicators be
developed for objectives set. For example the objective of access to land for food
production could have "All refugees/returnees who live in rural areas have access to
agricultural land, either through ownership, rental or share-cropping" as a benchmark and
the percent of refugees engaged in agriculture established as an indicator (UNHCR 2005:
Toolkit 58).
An example provided in the Handbook for Self-reliance is a project to increase the volume
and quality of honey produced in Uganda to meet market demand in Europe. Both refugees
and local residents were trained how to manage hives, process the beeswax and so on,
increasing their incomes and helping Uganda to strengthen it's market ties with Europe
(UNHCR 2005).
In Tanzania, Rwandan refugees were not permitted to farm their own land, but brought a
great deal of expertise and thus worked with local farmers, greatly increasing their
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productivity and providing some income to the refugees. The District Commissioner
admitted that the eventual departure of the refugees was a blow to a local economy, but
that the agricultural skills they had brought remained (UNHCR 2005). It is optimal when
the development and increasing self-reliance of refugees brings benefits to the surrounding
communities too, rather than fostering jealousy that can destabilize relations and lead to
problems.
Another example of self-reliance provided in the Handbook involves the provision of care
for IDPs in East Timor in the wake of incredible violence in 1999. According to Bernard
Kerblat, the Chief of the UNHCR's Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (UNHCR
2005: Book 1, 8-9):
The displaced were starving, had lost everything and were traumatised, but they
engaged in decision-making from the outset once humanitarian support was
available. They decided on the construction materials to be used. They selected the
beneficiaries of the operation. They planned who should do what. Despite their
circumstances their social organisation (their social self-reliance) provided a very
strong basis for their recovery. Furthermore, the people made key critical decisions
and designed and implemented what they wanted, to the extent that some agency
workers were defending the wishes of IDPs despite their own personal bias.
Allowing for self-reliance from the initial stages of a resettlement program can work to
avoid disempowerment in the first place, minimize dependency, and ensure that solutions
best, and most efficiently, meet residents' needs.
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It should be noted that the Framework for Durable Solutions sees greater self-sufficiency as
a medium-term way to improve the situation for refugees and their host communities and
prepare them for their ultimate departure from camps, not as a long-term solution (UNHCR
2003). It ultimately prescribes the repatriation, local integration outside of camps, or
resettlement to third countries of refugees. While each of these approaches may play a role
in the planning and management of CCDPs, the option of indefinitely resettling them in to
planned communities, drawing lessons from the UNHCR's work on self-reliance, among
other sources, may be a viable alternative in some cases. Of course, if resettlement is truly
indefinite, near-complete self-reliance is all the more important.
In terms of community engagement in decision-making, the UNHCR, which operates
between the emergency response and longer-term camp management spheres, argues that
there is value in having communities engaged as soon as possible to ensure that their needs
are being understood and met. The UNHCR Tool for Participatory Assessment in
Operations prescribes engagement at all stages, including structured dialogue at the initial
situation analysis phase to identify: The risks community members face, both individually
and in the aggregate; the capacities that exist within the community; and to discuss
solutions (UNHCR 2006). The Tool also recommends that community representatives be
involved in the technical aspects of defining strategies and programs. Community
engagement must be structured to ensure that standards are met. These standards should
include provisions that all voices are heard, information is appropriately shared between
planners and community members, and decisions will be made in an agreed upon fashion.
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Stum resettlement
Slums - informal settlements, typically with inadequate services, sub-standard
construction and unclear property rights - are a common feature of most developing world
cities. UN Habitat (2008) estimates that one-third of the world's city-dwellers, almost one
billion people, live in them. How municipalities and other actors address slums varies as
widely as the settlements themselves do (Tuhus-Dubrow 2009). There are commonalities
among refugee and IDP camps, as they are subjected to the same protocols and the same
agencies are usually involved. The pervasiveness of funding from the World Bank and its
sister development banks and agencies, and thus frequent application of the Bank's
standards on involuntary resettlement, results in commonalities among involuntary
resettlement planning too. It is difficult to find the same level of homogeneity among
projects working within slums, and thus impossible to prepare an exhaustive list of the
lessons that can be learned from the vast array of slum initiatives. It is, however, important
to note that slum resettlement is an area planning for CCDPs can draw from and thus is
deserving of further attention.
In many cities, resettlement was the traditional approach, with slums simply raised and
residents moved in to government housing in the best cases and left to fend for themselves
(i.e. move somewhere else until evicted from there too) in the worst (Tuhus-Dubrow
2009). More recently - recognizing the important and complex web of connections and
local knowledge that exists within slums, and that many resettlement programs were
failing - keeping residents where they are and conducting slum upgrades has become a
more popular approach. One of UN Habitat's core programs is, for example, its Slum
Upgrade Facility. The Facility supports the development of innovative urban financing
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instruments to support, largely grassroots, lending and projects so that families,
communities and city governments can improve their neighborhoods (UN Habitat 2008).
Resettlement is, however, still conducted in some cases, for various reasons. Climate
change may increase the frequency of cases in which resettlement is a better option than
upgrading, as many slums are built in the areas vulnerable to sea level rise, flooding and
other hazards, as that is the land that was least attractive to others and thus left for them to
build on (Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 2008).
In Mumbai, approximately 60,000 people were resettled from slums located in railway
yards as part of a railway improvement project (Patel, d'Cruz and Burra 2002). This
resettlement program, which was subject to the World Bank's Operational Policy on
Involuntary Resettlement, is interesting partly because all parties generally considered it a
success; residents and organizations representing them were intimately involved in the
resettlement process, residents were given high-quality replacement housing with
complete utilities, and no one had to be forcibly removed (Patel, d'Cruz and Burra 2002).
Patel, d'Cruz and Burra (2002) postulate that the involvement of competent non-
governmental organizations that were trusted and respected by both the residents and
state actors was central to the success of this case. These organizations were well-
prepared, having conducted community mapping to understand and mobilize their
constituencies in advance, and even conducted a 'house model exhibition' to get residents
thinking about what kinds of housing they would like and designing their own models.
Competent non-governmental organizations can play similar roles in CCDP resettlement,
helping communities defend their rights and become savvy about their options.
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